Assange – Useful Idiot or Willing Dupe of the US Right and Putin’s Russia?

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Recently there have been calls and pressure on the Biden Democratic administration, by supporters of Assange in Australia and the U.K., for him not to be deported and possibly pardoned (for charges brought by Trump administration), while many others contest his ‘journalism’ credentials, or at least how unhelpful his cause has been for journalism.

Convenient timing, as one observes how this also segues into criticism of Australia’s newish Labor government for not doing enough on his release, but ignores inactivity by both the former LNP conservative coalition government and the UK Conservative government, over many years to reach a solution; they didn’t even try?

Many supporters of Assange ignore salient facts of how he used Wikileaks, or at least went off piste on protocols when releasing material, links with Russia, Trump’s team, FoxNews, murder conspiracy theories and Assange’s vendetta towards Hilary Clinton, favouring Trump and the GOP.

Worse, many of the same supporters also share talking points with RWNJs, FoxNews/RT, Koch’s GOP Freedom Caucus, Trump, conspiracy theorists, pro Russian invasion, anti-vaxxer, anti-Covid science and related health measures.

For context, the experience of the same, including Assange cannot be compared to the risks that journalists, activists, politicians, NGOs and young people take in Russia, Turkey or elsewhere, where they are routinely censored, threatened, beaten, arrested, convicted, long gaol terms and simple murder or assassination. 

‘Mother Jones: ‘Denounce Julian Assange. Don’t Extradite Him.  

David Corn 17 December 2021

The prosecution of the conniving WikiLeaks founder poses a threat to American journalism. Julian Assange deserves condemnation. He doesn’t deserve extradition.

Last week, Assange, the founder of WikiLeaks who remains imprisoned in England, received bad news. A British judge ruled in favor of a US government request that Assange be extradited to the United States to face charges under the Espionage Act for having published classified diplomatic and military cables. This was a troubling development for anyone who cares about journalism and free speech.

The court decision was the latest turn in a long-running global legal battle. In April 2019, an indictment against Assange was unsealed in the United States. The charge was relatively minor: conspiracy to commit computer intrusion. The maximum possible sentence was five years imprisonment. It stemmed from his alleged effort in 2010 to help Chelsea Manning, then a US soldier, hack a classified database from which she obtained 750,000 secret military and State Department documents that she slipped to WikiLeaks. But weeks later the Trump administration further indicted Assange under the Espionage Act for having publicly posted the material WikiLeaks received from Manning. For that, he faces up to 170 years in prison.

This prosecution poses a serious threat to democracy. I’ll turn to that in a moment. But one PR problem with the case is that Assange is a highly unsympathetic character, for he is partly responsible for the damage done by Donald Trump during his presidency: 400,000 or more preventable deaths of Americans in the COVID-19 pandemic; the lack of action to address climate change; the promotion of disinformation and lies to incite a violent attack on the US Capitol; a tax cut that favored the wealthy and added to the national debt; right-wing appointments to the Supreme Court that could lead to the severe curtailing of reproductive rights for women; the spread of bigotry and racial hatred; the suppression of voting rights; cutbacks in government health programs; creeping (or galloping) authoritarianism; and so much more.

The United States has suffered greatly because of Assange. In 2016, he collaborated with the Russian attack on the US election to help Trump win. As has been detailed by several government investigations—including in special counsel Robert Mueller’s final report and in a bipartisan report issued by the Senate Intelligence Committee last year—after Russian intelligence teams hacked Democratic targets, they passed the stolen emails and documents to WikiLeaks, which then publicly disseminated the material.

The Senate report notes that Assange’s group “timed its document releases for maximum political impact.” That is, WikiLeaks wasn’t acting in a noble information-sharing manner. It sought to weaponize the information pilfered by Vladimir Putin’s operatives to cause harm to candidate Hillary Clinton, whom Assange and WikiLeaks had disparaged as a “sadistic sociopath” and a threat to the world. (“We believe it would be much better for [the] GOP to win,” WikiLeaks had tweeted.)

In disseminating the stolen information, WikiLeaks behaved more as a political hit squad than a media organization. For example, when the Washington Post on October 7, 2016, published the Access Hollywood video showing Trump bragging about grabbing women “by the pussy,” half an hour later WikiLeaks began releasing emails Russian hackers had swiped from John Podesta, the chair of Hillary Clinton’s campaign. This was a counterblow, an attempt to rescue Trump with a distraction. And to inflict the most pain it could on the Clinton campaign, WikiLeaks did not dump all the Podesta information at once (as it had done with its previous release of Democratic Party material at the start of the Democrats’ convention that July). Instead, the group doled out the documents in batches, almost daily, to ensure there would be a steady stream of negative Clinton stories for the final four weeks of the campaign. Assange and WikiLeaks were full partners with Putin in a plot aimed at electing Trump president.

And Assange tried to cover up Russia’s role in this perfidious operation. As the Senate report states:

Assange and WikiLeaks undertook efforts to obscure the source of the stolen emails, including through false narratives. Assange’s use of such disinformation suggests Assange possibly knew of and sought to hide Russian involvement. One narrative from Assange involved a conspiracy theory that Seth Rich, a DNC staffer killed in a botched robbery, was the source of the DNC email and had been murdered in response. On August 9 [2016], Assange gave an interview on Dutch television implying that Rich was the source of the DNC emails, and that day WikiLeaks announced that it would be issuing a reward for information about Rich’s murder. In a subsequent interview, Assange commented about the WikiLeaks interest in the Rich case as concerning “someone who’s potentially connected to our publication.” The Committee found that no credible evidence supports this narrative.

Assange was pushing a baseless and odious conspiracy theory (which caused tremendous distress for Rich’s family) that was also being championed by conspiracy nutter Alex Jones, Fox News’ Sean Hannity, and Russian intelligence. His apparent goal was to hide the Kremlin’s role in the pro-Trump/anti-Clinton hack-and-leak scheme that WikiLeaks was facilitating. This is not how a legitimate news organization functions. (By the way, the Senate report also issued this indictment of the Trump campaign: “The Trump Campaign publicly undermined the attribution of the hack-and-leak campaign to Russia and was indifferent to whether it and WikiLeaks were furthering a Russian election interference effort.” That is, Trump and his crew aided and abetted Moscow’s attack on the 2016 election.)

Assange and WikiLeaks connived and lied to help Trump vanquish Clinton. The Podesta information dumps were a steady drag on the Clinton campaign in the final stretch, often preventing it from gaining traction for its own messages and themes. These releases also served as a constant reminder to the public of her own email controversy—and as an effective setup for the last-minute revelation from then–FBI Director James Comey that the bureau might have unearthed missing or previously destroyed Clinton emails. (It hadn’t.)

Given how close the election ended up, the Russia-WikiLeaks operation was one of several factors that determined the outcome. Remove Putin’s hackers and Assange’s outfit from the picture, and Clinton probably would have won. (Ditto for Comey’s move, as well as for Clinton’s own decision not to do more in several swing states in the last week.) Assange can (proudly?) claim a degree of ownership of the election results. That means he also partly owns what came afterward. He and WikiLeaks opposed Clinton, they contended, because she was a warmonger. There is no way of telling whether she would have started any wars had she been president. But it’s a damn good bet that had she been in charge during the pandemic, far fewer Americans would have perished.

Assange ought to be punished—if only ostracized and widely denigrated—for his 2016 skullduggery. But the extradition case at hand does not address that. Focused on an earlier episode, it is an excessive use of legal force by the US government—first the Trump administration and now the Biden administration. The Obama administration considered charging Assange for releasing the Manning material under the Espionage Act—which was intended to be used against spies and their collaborators—but it was concerned about a negative impact on journalists. Obtaining and publishing classified documents—and asking sources to provide such material—is a common activity for many news organizations.

When Assange was indicted on these espionage charges, John Demers, then the head of the Justice Department’s National Security Division, said Assange was “no journalist.” Given Assange’s underhanded partnership with Russian intelligence, that may well be an accurate statement. But the actions for which he has been indicted under the Espionage Act are the actions of reporters. And media organizations are correct to worry about a precedent being established. (Most Espionage Act cases have involved government employees who leaked classified information.) As the New York Times reported at the time of the Assange indictment, “Notably, The New York Times, among many other news organizations, obtained precisely the same archives of documents from WikiLeaks, without authorization from the government—the act that most of the charges addressed… [I]t is not clear how that is legally different from publishing other classified information.”

Media outlets and free speech advocates have justifiably howled about this case. Kenneth Roth, the executive director of Human Rights Watch, noted, “The Assange prosecution threatens these basic elements of modern journalism and democratic accountability.” And the Committee to Protect Journalists last week issued this statement: “The U.S. Justice Department’s dogged pursuit of the WikiLeaks founder has set a harmful legal precedent for prosecuting reporters simply for interacting with their sources. The Biden administration pledged at its Summit for Democracy this week to support journalism. It could start by removing the threat of prosecution under the Espionage Act now hanging over the heads of investigative journalists everywhere.”

Considering all the devastation Assange enabled with his 2016 plot against America, it is tough to embrace him as a free-speech martyr. But those who care about accountability and excessive government power don’t always get to choose the battles that must be waged to preserve First Amendment freedoms. Assange mounted a damaging attack on the United States and facilitated a profound subversion of its political system. Still, his prosecution under the Espionage Act is another assault on American democracy.

Assange’s attorneys say they will appeal the decision, which calls for a lower court to send the case to the British home secretary for a decision on whether Assange ought to be extradited. Meanwhile, Assange will remain in Belmarsh Prison in London. He spent almost seven years in the Ecuadorian embassy in London, ducking extradition to Sweden for a sex crimes case, which was dropped in 2015; he was arrested in 2019 related to bail-skipping charges and the extradition warrant from the United States.

Assange did help put in the White House a wannabe authoritarian who demonized reporters and dangerously claimed the media was the “enemy of the people.” (And the ingrate paid Assange back by indicting him.) Yet now his personal fate is tied to the protection of First Amendment rights. The Biden administration ought to drop Espionage Act case against Assange—not for his sake, but for the rest of us.’

Developing Better Asian Capability Education in Australia

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Australian article from the Conversation on ‘Supporting our Schools to Develop Asia Capable Kids’ to develop Asian capabilities not just on China, but neighbours in the Asian century. 

It’s the opposite of UK PM Sunak’s policy idea of mathematics till the end of secondary school, due to issues with maths literacy in society, amongst adults, who also need education.

However, on Asian capability, school is important along with general society, especially our influential middle aged elites in media, politics and the corporate world of ‘skip’ or Anglo-Irish heritage of the past decade, many seem to have shared antipathy towards the region?

An example is how many Australians have been to Bali, but neither understand that it’s part of Indonesia, nor the significance of the Indonesian economy now and in future i.e. it is expected to become the 7th largest economy in the world by 2030.

For Australia’s influential elite cohorts, many seem more interested in the ‘Anglosphere’ of UK and USA, than Australia’s role in our region?

SUPPORTING OUR SCHOOLS TO DEVELOP ASIA CAPABLE KIDS

Asia capable initiatives that only target adults and young adults leaves it far too late – it has to start in our schools

By Chris Higgins, University of Melbourne

As the world becomes progressively more connected and interconnected, it’s increasingly important for all people to develop the skills and knowledge necessary to engage with different cultures and countries.

This is particularly important for our young people who are growing into an increasingly complex and dynamic world.

More than ever, they need to possess the capabilities to navigate a fast-changing and diverse world and work together to overcome complex global challenges.

For Australia, the world’s largest island, physically located in the Asia-Pacific region, this is of paramount importance.

Our Indigenous peoples have more than 60,000 years continuous connection, histories and culture, and have been trading with international partners for many thousands of years.

These deep economic, social and cultural ties to other countries continue today.

We are one of the most multicultural countries in the world, with a diverse population made up of people from over 200 different countries with a long history of immigration, shaped by successive waves of migrants from different parts of the world.

Today, almost a third of Australia’s population was born overseas, and more than 400 different languages – including 167 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander languages – are spoken in Australian homes.

Our diversity is reflected in our cities, towns, communities and homes, where people from diverse cultural backgrounds live side-by-side, sharing traditions, customs, languages and experiences.

The Australian government has long recognised our multiculturalism, the benefits of social cohesion, respect for cultural diversity and our place in the Asia-Pacific region.

In 2012, the Australian Government released the Australia in the Asian Century White Paper, which outlined a vision for Australia to deepen its engagement with the Asian region and the advantages of the region’s growth and rising influence.

The White Paper called for a comprehensive approach to developing Asia capability across all sectors of Australian society, including government, business, education and the community.

It also highlighted the need to increase language skills and cultural awareness as well as knowledge of Asian markets and regulatory frameworks across the ‘whole-of-nation’.

Since the release of the White Paper, the Australian Government continued to support development of Asia capability in many areas including initiatives like the New Colombo Plan, which provides funding for Australian university students to study and undertake internships in the Asia-Pacific region.

But, all too often, initiatives like this focus on economic priorities and adults in tertiary education or the existing workforce.

Rarely do they support our young people who will become our adult learners and workforce of the future.

Despite recent references from the Australian government to strengthen ‘whole-of-nation’ Asia capability there has been almost no support for Asia capability in Australian schools since 2012.

Asia capable initiatives that only target adults and young adults leaves it far too late. There needs to be support for our young people to develop Asia capability.

Australian schools and classrooms reflect the very multicultural and diverse nature of our nation. Our students and teachers represent a broad diversity of cultures, languages, experiences and perspectives – which are becoming more diverse each year.

Students need the support to develop these essential skills.

Often economic explanations are cited as the main arguments for developing Asia capability

The Asia-Pacific region is one of the fastest-growing and most dynamic regions in the world, with significant economic, political and cultural influence.

Young people who develop Asia capability will be well-placed to take advantage of the opportunities to collaborate and prosper from shared regional growth and influence.

Another well-worn reason is that Asia capability is essential for promoting national security and diplomatic relations.

As Australia’s relationships in the region deepen, it’s important for our students to develop an understanding of the strategic and geopolitical dynamics of the region, as well as the cultural and linguistic skills necessary to engage with people and organisations.

However, these explanations miss the far more relevant and immediate benefits. Asia capability promotes cultural understanding and social cohesion. By developing an understanding of different cultures and languages, our young people can develop empathy and respect for different ways of life – building bridges between different communities and promoting social harmony.

It’s essential our students and teachers are supported to have the knowledge, understanding, skills and attitudes to create cohesive, inclusive, diverse schools. In turn, they will become adults who have the capabilities to support cohesive communities, societies, nation and a shared, prosperous Asia-Pacific.

The means to deliver this already exist.

The Australian Curriculum recognises our diversity and includes several Cross-Curriculum Priorities and General Capabilities all educators and schools are expected to support for students.

The Cross-Curriculum Priority of Asia and Australia’s Engagement with Asia and the General Capability of Intercultural Understanding that all teachers are expected to support, regardless of subject areas taught, are crucial components of the Australian Curriculum.

But they are often perceived as add-ons, the responsibility of other discipline areas like languages. Many teachers don’t have the resources or time to embed them in their classrooms or don’t feel they have strong Asia capability.

Investing in supporting our Asia capability, by making teaching knowledge and resources available to the entire Australian school education workforce is crucial to achieving the intention of the Australian Curriculum and the Australian government’s priority of whole-of-nation Asia capability and strengthened ties with the region.

The Asia Education Foundation has released a Pre-Budget Submission to the Australian Government calling on the Commonwealth to support Asia capability in all schools.’

For more related articles and blogs on Adult Learning, Asian Century, Cross Cultural Communication, Media, Pedagogy, Soft Skills, Teaching in Australia and Younger Generations click through

Australia: Return to the Future of an Asian Century vs. the Anglosphere Colonial Past

Australia Return to the Anglosphere – Ignoring the Australian Eurasian Society and the Asian Century

Asian Century Starts 2020?

History of Globalisation and 21st Century

China PRC – Fertility Decline – Peak Population?

Media on China and Wuhan Virus – Critical Analysis or Political PR?

Australian Migration Review 2023 – For Immigrants and Nation or a Nativist Trap?

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The Australian Migration Review Report has been published, based on narratives and submissions, but little meaningful grass roots feedback or data to support any grounded analysis for good future reforms?

This post will focus on NOM Net Overseas Migration and major source or factor i.e. international education and students, but for now, not the other main factors including WHV Working Holiday Visas (2nd year) and temporary workers.

There are generic review report issues e.g. lack of direct support for many narratives and recommendations, does not explain budget issues of ageing i.e. more low or no tax payers in retirement as baby boomer bubble transitions vs. decline in working age cohort of PAYE taxpayers, to support more Australian retirees.

Further, barely references ‘black swan’ event Covid and the effect it had on Australia including closed borders, preceded by under-resourced and slow processing of most visa types onshore and then via the NOM education, tourism, travel etc. simply caught up?

The focus of this post is the potential reform of limiting or capping the NOM Net Overseas Migration which shows a suboptimal understanding i.e. it’s a ‘barometer’ not a visa or migration program that can controlled by any specific or exact measure, but only by capping education enrolments or Working Holiday Visas?

This would be a repeat of the Gillard government’s response to ‘wedges’ by media and right wing NGOs’ dog whistling of the NOM (quietly expanded in 2006 by the UNPD) spike, ‘Big Australia’, supposed environmental hygiene issues of modern ‘immigrants’, appointing a Minister for Sustainable Australia and giving higher education (higher value) advantage over the VET Vocational sector; but worse in the UK.

The UK also uses the same ‘nebulous’ UNPD defined NOM formula to quantify border movements, but also misrepresented as ‘immigration’, followed by media headlines and dog whistling in late ‘90s, ‘wedging’ UK Conservative PM Cameron into action on reducing ‘immigration’, from The Guardian (11 January 2010):

Tories would limit immigration to ‘tens of thousands’ a year, says Cameron. Conservative leader says net immigration of 200,000 people a year is ‘too much’…..”We would like to see net immigration in the tens of thousands rather than the hundreds of thousands,” he told BBC1’s Andrew Marr Show.’

Cameron complained of the media ‘banging on about (EU) immigration’ then pledged to reduce the NOM dramatically, hence, immigration, but the numbers then rose and was compelled to call the European Referendum, that led to Brexit over immigration and identity, again by the media and far right; negative Brexit outcomes, not dividends, are still occurring with working age decline.

Summary through excerpts of the introduction and later focus upon NOM Net Overseas Migration:

REVIEW OF THE MIGRATION SYSTEM – FINAL REPORT 2023

The Reviewers

Dr Martin Parkinson AC PSM, Chair

Professor Joanna Howe

Mr John Azarias

Reviewers and the Department of Home Affairs Migration Reform Taskforce (containing 

secondees from the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Treasury, Foreign Affairs and Trade, and Jobs and Skills Australia, and Boston Consulting Group).

(inc. indirectly Prof. Peter McDonald, demographer at University of Melbourne who also made a one page submission that a media outlet, like most, misrepresented immigration and population data due to a lack of data literacy, but this has been occurring for decades?)

We identified five objectives, discussed in further detail in this report, on which to 

build the program:

1. Building Australia’s prosperity by lifting productivity, meeting labour 

supply needs and by supporting exports

2. Enabling a fair labour market, including by complementing the jobs, wages 

and conditions of domestic workers

3. Building a community of Australians

4. Protecting Australia’s interests in the world.

5. Providing a fast, efficient and fair system.

The unique complexities of migration and the gaps in our understanding of the 

effects of our migration system – on migrants and Australia – highlight the critical 

need for better data, more program evaluation and research to inform better 

program design. We can’t stay on track if we don’t know how we are going, nor can 

we drive improvement or share data with stakeholders who are trying to make a 

difference too.

Australia is not focused enough on capturing high potential international students. This chapter considers the success of the Student visa in supporting the export of Australian education, but also the missed opportunity to better support and select the best and brightest students as skilled migrants’ (motherhood statement?). 

Reform directions for Government to consider

Through the course of the Panel’s deliberations, we arrived at a set of reform 

directions that could be considered by Government as it decides on its approach to 

the migration system. These are set out below, and described in greater detail 

throughout the report.

Possible reform directions:

Redefine how  Australia determines the size and composition of the migration program

6. Plan migration based on net overseas migration (which accounts for both permanent and temporary residents), rather than simply relying on permanent migration caps (p. 8).

5. AUSTRALIA NEEDS LONG-TERM AND HOLISTIC MIGRATION PLANNING (p. 41)

Today, Australia mainly relies on the annual permanent migration cap to manage migrant numbers. This is a poor tool for driving predictability of overall migration flows. Government needs to consider the optimal size and composition of migrant intakes (temporary and permanent) over the medium to long term in the best interests of Australia.’

If the supply of infrastructure and housing does not keep up with demand created by migration, the quality of infrastructure and housing services may deteriorate, and prices may rise. As a result, material and non-material living standards of the local population and newly arrived migrants may be undermined (unsupported by any research evidence?)

Without appropriate policy responses, large and unanticipated increases in labour supply, or sharp falls in demand, can lead in the short run to both falling real wages and higher unemployment.

Social cohesion can also be undermined if the pace of migration is greater than the time it takes for migrants to settle, integrate and become part of the community. Costs imposed on local communities (housing, labour market impacts) can also reduce cohesion and have an impact on migrant integration and prosperity.’ (unsupported by any research evidence?)

There is no evidence provided, and apart from the media encouraging dog whistling to reinforce negative perceptions and attitudes, there isn’t any? In fact opposite, from Foster’s surveys in ‘Immigration and the Australian economy’ (2012):

‘William Foster’s surveys over 200 studies on immigration and wages. He found there was, “a marginally favourable effect on the aggregate unemployment rate, even in recession”.’

Migration planning needs to remain flexible to changing economic 

Environments (pp. 47-9):

During periods of high NOM, like 2006–09 and 2016–19 (Figure 15), there were 

increased concerns about congestion in cities, as infrastructure and other support 

did not keep pace with population growth in some areas. This led to falling support 

for the migration program (not supported by research evidence?).

This experience helps provide guidance for a recommended NOM level* relative to 

population growth, given the current levels of investment.’

Since when can the NOM be micromanaged, simply evidence of suboptimal understanding of the NOM and the multiple factors it’s derived from, acting as ‘barometer’? Neither Figures 14 or 15 etc. highlight a significant demographic event related to the NOM, i.e. UNPD’s expansion in 2006, which spiked the NOM, hence, estimated resident population. 

‘Reform directions

The Panel suggests Government consider moving beyond reliance on the permanent migration cap as the only tool for managing migration flows. Specifically, there might be value in developing ways of better managing temporary migration, alongside permanent migration. This likely means government would be attempting to manage NOM – which is the truer measure of migration’s impact on population growth, communities and the economy.’ 

On international education – indirect contribution from peak bodies or stakeholders via submissions, yet international education is the largest source of NOM captures or border movements 12/16+ months, but ignored the expansion and inflation in 2006?

Also largely ignored the impact of Covid and slow onshore visa processing by the previous LNP government, like the UK may have been to discourage those hoping for substantive residency visas.

Warning to the Australian government, be careful what you (are encouraged to) wish for, by trying to control population via the NOM they are falling into a ‘nativist trap’?

For more related post and blog on Ageing Democracy, Australian Politics, Demography, NOM Net Overseas Migration, Population Growth, Populist Politics and White Nationalism  click through:

Economic Research – No Negative Relationship with Immigration and Wages, Income or Employment

Population Pyramids, Economics, Ageing, Pensions, Demography and Misunderstanding Data Sets

Population Decline and Effects on Taxation, Benefits, Economy and Society

Malthus on Population Growth, Economy, Environment, White Nationalism and Eugenics

Immigration Population Growth Decline NOM Net Overseas Migration

NOM Net Overseas Migration – Immigration – Population Growth

EU & Anglosphere – Refugees – Border Walls vs. Working Age Decline

Putin’s Supporters in Europe and Anglosphere: Willing Dupes and Useful Idiots?

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Article from the ECFR European Council on Foreign Relations in 2016 describing those aligned or allied with Putin’s Russia on both the European left and right, while the latter are adopted or supported by Putin’s Russia, with recommendations on what Europe could do, warning of Russia’s covert support for populist parties; post Brexit, pre Trump and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Putin’s friends in Europe

The upsurge of populism in Europe has provided Russia with an ample supply of sympathetic political parties across the continent.

Fredrik Wesslau 19 October 2016

The upsurge of populism in Europe has provided Russia with an ample supply of sympathetic political parties across the continent. These parties – mostly from the far right but also from the far left – are pursuing policies and taking positions that advance Russia’s agenda in Europe. They tend to be anti-establishment parties ― some on the extreme fringes of the political spectrum ― that challenge the mainstream liberal order in Europe. Many of these parties are working actively to undo the European project. They are generally suspicious of the United States and want to reduce its influence in Europe.

In June ECFR carried out the first comprehensive survey of ‘insurgent’ parties in Europe. It found that, despite their differences, a majority of them are positively inclined towards Putin’s Russia and pursue policies that promote Russia’s interests in Europe.

While Russia is not responsible for the emergence of these pro-Russian parties, it has embraced them, especially as relations between the West and Russia have deteriorated. The parties are useful for Moscow in that they help legitimise the Kremlin’s policies and amplify Russian disinformation. At times they can also shift Europe’s domestic debates in Russia’s favour. But it is their politics of disruption – underpinned by their scepticism towards the European Union – that does most to destabilise European politics.

It would be a mistake to portray these parties as Russian stooges. The parties’ pro-Russian policies are underpinned by conviction and an affinity with ideological tenets of Putin’s Russia. But while the parties are not under Moscow’s control, the extent to which Russia directly supports them has become an increasingly important question, as tensions rise between Russia and the West. Russian influencing efforts in the West have come under particular scrutiny since the leak of thousands of Democratic National Committee emails in July was attributed to Russian meddling in US politics.

Alignment with Russia

To what extent do the insurgent parties align with Russia? A majority of the 45 insurgent parties identified by ECFR were favourably inclined towards Russia and sympathised with Russian positions. The most pro-Russian of these parties (of a significant size) on the far right are: the AfD, FPÖ, Greece’s Golden Dawn, Hungary’s Jobbik, France’s Front National, Italy’s Northern League, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), and Belgium’s Vlaams Belang (VB). On the far left, the most pro-Russian parties are Cyprus’s AKEL, Germany’s Die Linke, the Czech Republic’s KSCM, Podemos in Spain, and Syriza. The Italian Five Star Movement and the Human Shield Party in Croatia also belong to the pro-Russian camp.

Voting patterns in the European Parliament shows that on issues such as Ukraine, the human rights situation in Russia, and association agreements with Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, the Dutch PVV leads the pack in pro-Russian votes. UKIP, the Sweden Democrats, Italy’s Northern League, and France’s Front National come in a shared second place. Insurgent parties from the far left – Spain’s Podemos, Greece’s Syriza, and Germany’s Die Linke – are not far behind.

All of these parties, with the exception of Syriza and PVV, oppose EU sanctions on Russia and none believe that the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) with Ukraine should be implemented in full. All the parties are Eurosceptic to varying degrees.

The pro-Russian stance of these parties derives largely from conviction and from an ideological affinity with Putin’s Russia. On the far right, many are attracted to Russia’s socially conservative values, its defence of national sovereignty, and its rejection of liberal internationalism and interventionism. On the left, many of the insurgents are attracted by Russia’s antipathy towards globalisation and its challenge to the US-dominated international capitalist order, as well as a nostalgic link to the Soviet Union. Both fringes tend to see Russia as a counter to the United States.

Friends with benefits

These parties have proven useful to Moscow in various ways. They have provided convenient sources of legitimisation domestically – and to some extent internationally – on issues such as Crimea. The Kremlin is able to point to them as “evidence” of Russia not being isolated and of there being supportive voices in Europe. This was seen during the referendum in Crimea in March 2014. While the OCSE did not send observers to Crimea, a group of European politicians from far right parties, including from the FPÖ, VB, FN, Jobbik, and Northern League, went there as observers. This was presented by Moscow as international legitimisation of the referendum.

They have also proven capable of shifting the centre of political discourse in Russia’s favour. In France, for example, former president and presidential hopeful, Nicolas Sarkozy, who belongs to the political mainstream has taken an increasingly sympathetic line towards Russia as presidential elections in 2017 approach. He has called for the lifting of sanctions against Russia and argued that Crimea has a right to become part of Russia. This line is part of his election strategy to adopt positions from the National Front in order to co-opt their votes.

But it is not just in matters of policy that these parties’ sympathies with the Kremlin are revealed. In them Moscow has also found convenient and willing conveyors of its anti-Western, anti-globalisation narratives. Several of the far right leaders, such as Nigel Farage, Geert Wilders and Marine Le Pen, are frequent guests on Russia Today (RT) and Sputnik, with Farage reportedly having been offered his own show on RT.

The “Operation Liza” case in Germany, where a false Russian story of a 13-year-old Russian-German girl having been raped by immigrants was picked up and spread by members of the far right AfD and Die Linke, which has close ties to Germans of Russian descent, was a prime example of the role these parties play in amplifying Russian disinformation.

Finally, the anti-EU and anti-NATO strand of insurgent parties benefits Russia by weakening Western consensus and institutions. The Dutch referendum on the EU’s association agreement with Ukraine in April 2016 was an example of how insurgents in the minority were able to obstruct EU policy to Russia’s benefit. But this was most clearly seen in UKIP’s leading role in Britain’s decision to leave the European Union, with several Eurosceptic parties in Europe now following in UKIP’s footsteps and pushing for their own referendums on EU membership. Several parties, including AKEL, Die Linke, FPÖ, Golden Dawn, KSCM, and Jobbik are also opposed to the NATO alliance.

Russian support and the populist upsurge

But while it is clear that Moscow benefits from the pro-Russian stance of populist parties in Europe and in some cases uses them for propaganda purposes, it is less clear to what extent there is collusion. The notion that Russia might be funding agents of influence by providing financing to sympathetic parties in Europe has become more salient as relations between Russia and the West have deteriorated.

The most well-publicised case of a European political party receiving funding from Russia is the loan to Front National, which has aligned itself with Russia on a range of issues. It has recognised Russia’s annexation of Crimea and event sent observers to the Crimean referendum, providing international legitimisation for the Kremlin. 

Leaked SMS exchanges indicate that the Front National’s stance on Crimea was the subject of correspondence between Russian officials, who agreed that the party should be “thanked” somehow for recognising the results of the referendum in Crimea. While Front National has denied that there was any quid pro quo, eight months later the party received a loan of €9.46 million from the First Czech Russian National Bank ― a financial institution with links to the Kremlin. Marine Le Pen has publicly acknowledged the loan – equivalent to the Front National’s total revenue for 2013 – citing the party’s inability to secure financing from European sources.

The founder of Front National, Jean-Marie Le Pen, has also received a €2.5 million loan through his company Cotelec, from a Cyprus-based company that is owned by a former KGB agent who was expelled from Britain in 1985 on charges of spying.

The loans to Front National seem to be a rare case of acknowledged Russian financing of a party.  But does it amount to collusion? Not necessarily since Front National would probably have taken pro-Russian positions in any case. But the money does act as an enabler.

There is circumstantial evidence and rumours of covert support for other radical parties in Europe, but little solid evidence exists in the public domain. The lack of information may not be surprising since this sort of activity typically belongs to the opaque world of intelligence services.

But even if one assumes that Russia does not provide financial support to any other party, the way Moscow uses them to legitimise its own narrative and spread disinformation is in itself a cause for concern. They become ― wittingly or unwittingly ― part of an increasingly assertive and hostile Russian foreign policy towards the West.

So what should Europe do?

To begin with, European leaders should recognise that dealing with domestic populism is the greater challenge. Today, anti-establishment politics are a fact throughout Europe. And the political tides are still moving in their direction; several more may find themselves empowered after elections in Germany, France, Netherlands, and possibly Italy, in 2017.

But while Russia is not behind the growth of populism, it is certainly benefiting from it. Insurgent parties have a right to take positions that align with those of Russia, within the limits of democratic politics. But covert Russian actions to support these parties and to spread disinformation undermine the democratic basis of European societies.

European law enforcement agencies should prioritise looking into Russian covert support for populist parties and taking steps to counter such support. European governments should consider publishing intelligence on this in the public domain. Voters have a right to be informed about whom they are voting for.

European governments should introduce stricter regulation of political party financing, notably when that financing is from foreign sources, and increased transparency requirements in relation to funding. A stricter implementation of national corruption and money laundering legislation would also go some way to countering illegal money transfers.’

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