British Young People Thrown Under a Bus for Votes in Ageing Demographics

Relevant article from John Curtice of the University of Strathclyde on how age determines divides in British politics, and not class in Conversation article ‘Age, not class, is now the biggest divide in British politics, new research confirms’.

This also suggests the impact of demography i.e. ageing populations living longer, with above median age voters being targeted by not just parties and policies, but consolidated right wing media and US Koch Network linked think tanks at Tufton on broad social economic policies including Brexit, immigration, pensions and health care.

‘Age, not class, is now the biggest divide in British politics, new research confirms

21st September 2023

John Curtice

Senior Research Fellow, National Centre for Social Research, and Professor of Politics, University of Strathclyde

“Class is the basis of British politics; all else is embellishment and detail.” So wrote Peter Pulzer, the former Gladstone professor of politics at the University of Oxford in the 1960s. Nowadays, however, it is age, not social class, that is the biggest demographic division in Britain’s electoral politics.

According to the British Election Study, at the 2019 general election, the Conservatives won the support of 56% of those aged 55 and over, but only 24% of those under 35. Conversely, Labour was backed by 54% of those under-35s who cast a vote, but by just 22% of those aged 55 and over.

In contrast, support for Britain’s two main parties among those in working class occupations was little different from that among those in professional and managerial jobs.

But what underpins this age divide? We typically think of Labour as a party that is more “left wing”, more concerned than the Conservatives about inequality and more supportive of “big government”. So does young people’s greater willingness to support Labour mean they are more left wing than their older counterparts?

Are they more concerned about inequality and more inclined to believe that government should be acting to reduce it? And are they more inclined than older voters to want the government to spend and tax more?

These questions are addressed in a chapter in the latest British Social Attitudes report, published by the National Centre for Social Research. Based on the 40 years of data the annual BSA survey has collected since it began in 1983, the chapter reveals that while younger people have become more concerned about inequality in recent years, this is not accompanied by greater enthusiasm for more tax and spend.

Since 1986, nearly every BSA survey has regularly presented its respondents with a set of propositions designed to measure how “left” or “right wing” they are on the issue of inequality. People are, for example, asked whether they agree or disagree that “there is one law for the rich and one for the poor”, and “government should redistribute income from the better-off to those who are less well-off”.

Their answers to these and similar statements can be summarised into a scale measure that runs from 0 to 100, where 0 means that someone is very left wing and 100 indicates that they are very right wing.

Young people shift left

When the scale was first administered in 1986, there was no difference between the average score of those aged under 35 and those aged 55 or over. Both had a score of 37.

Equally, 30 years later, in 2016, younger people’s average score of 38 was little different from that of 37 among older people. The growth in Labour’s support among younger people that was already in evidence by then was not underpinned by a more left-wing point of view.

However, a gap has emerged during the last three or four years. In the latest BSA survey, conducted towards the end of 2022, young people scored 28 – ten points below the equivalent figure in 2016. In contrast, at 36, the outlook of older people has barely changed at all.

Yet this does not mean that younger people want more taxation and spending. Every year since 1983 BSA has asked people what the government should do if it has to choose between increased taxation and spending on “health, education and social benefits”, reduced taxation and spending, or keeping things as they are.

In the 1980s, younger people were typically more likely than older people to say that taxation and spending should be increased. In 1984, for example, 42% of those aged under 35 expressed that view, compared with just 33% of those over 55.

But since the mid-90s the opposite has been the case. By 2015, 41% of younger people wanted more taxation and spending compared with 49% of older people.

Meanwhile, the gap has since widened further. Whereas support for increased taxation and spending has risen to 67% among older people – the highest it has been in the last 40 years – among younger people it is still no more than 43%.

Lost faith

So why might have younger people become more concerned about inequality, yet at the same time less supportive of more spending? The answer may well lie in the distinctive economic position in which those in today’s youngest generation find themselves.

The ageing of Britain’s population means that a larger proportion of government spending goes on health and social care from which older people primarily benefit. Meanwhile, while older people are in receipt of relatively generous pensions that have been protected by the triple lock, younger people who have been to university find themselves in effect paying a higher level of “income tax” in order to pay off their student loans.

Meanwhile, although the pandemic posed a greater threat to the health of older people, it was younger people who were more likely to find their educational and economic lives disrupted, and to have found themselves having to endure lockdown in lower quality accommodation. At the same time, home ownership has become more difficult, not least because so many are spending a significant proportion of their income on rent.

There is, then, good reason why younger people have become more concerned about inequality but seem at the same time to doubt that increased taxation and spending would help them.

The challenge to the parties at the forthcoming election could well be to convince these voters that the next government will offer them a brighter future, rather than add to their woes. But to do that they may well need to be willing to think outside the traditional mindsets associated with the terms “left” and the “right”.’

John Curtice, Senior Research Fellow, National Centre for Social Research, and Professor of Politics, University of Strathclyde

For related blogs and articles on Ageing Democracy, Conservative, Demography, Government Budgets, Media, Pensions, Political Strategy, Populist Politics and Younger Generations click through:

Collective Narcissism, Ageing Electorates, Pensioner Populism, White Nativism and Autocracy

Narcissistic Political Leaders – NPD Narcissistic Personality Disorder – Collective Narcissism – Cognitive Dissonance – Conspiracy Theories – Populism

Nationalist Conservative Political Parties in the Anglosphere – Radical Right Libertarian Ideology and Populism for Votes

Ageing Democracy, Nativism and Populism

Growth of Conservative Hard Right Wing or Nativist Authoritarian Regimes

Future Retirement Income Systems – Australian Superannuation and State Old Age Pension

Developed nations are ageing with increasing numbers of retirees going onto pensions, but backgrounded by increasing old age dependency ratios while decline in working age cohorts, which pay taxes to support budgets. Many nations now are desperate in attracting long term temporary net migration or churn over of workers, students, digital nomads etc. as ‘net financial budget contributors’ who cannot and will not access services and budgets, open only to citizens and some permanent residents.

See OECD (2023), Australian Old-age dependency ratio (indicator). doi: 10.1787/e0255c98-en (Accessed on 07 August 2023)

Australia’s solution, still in a generational development phase for another generation, was to introduce industry superannuation under a Labor government in the 1980s-90s, tracking the baby boomer ‘bubble’ which is now in transition to retirement; influenced by the US 401(K) employee accounts system.

Rationale was the need to provide retirement income, public healthcare and other services, but keeping pressure off budgets and/or pension funds by introducing superannuation for employees paid by employers i.e. industry, in addition to public/independent, retail or self managed; all invest in mix of shares, property, fixed interest etc.. 

Employers pay the SCG Superannuation Contribution Guarantee into people’s individual or multiple superannuation accounts, also allows personal contributions, tax breaks or incentives and compounding, for then later to access income streams in retirement.

While the state pension is and has been a citizenship right to apply, especially for single retirees without substantial superannuation funds, it is means and assets tested i.e. if no or little superannuation income, full pension is available, then tapering downwards to zero depending level of Superannuation retirement income stream and thresholds.

Win win for Australians now and into the future, but it has been under constant attack by right wing parties, Koch linked think tanks and media (as a proxy for unions), described as a tax on business, gives funds too much financial power and influence e.g. including those linked to unions, while total now stands at approximately 2 trillion Euros, then conversely the same complain that the system is used as a tax dodge by wealthy…. or demands to allow substantive access at an early age for buying property….. Trying to crash the system.

Following is an article from former Australian Treasurer Wayne Swan in The Daily News owned by  giving good analysis and overview of how the benefits far outweigh any costs, keep budgets balanced and retirees comfortable, whether they have superannuation, or not.

‘From The New Daily Australia:

Wayne Swan: Superannuation’s benefits continue to stack up as ideologues attack

It wasn’t all that long ago that for most people retirement meant just getting by on the pension.

No luxuries, no holidays, no spoiling the grandchildren. Such things were the preserve of a very lucky minority with generous pension plans attached to their salaries – airline pilots, professors, bank workers, public servants, police force members, and others.

For the rest, giving up work might mean living on the borderline between sufficiency and poverty.

Today, thanks to industry superannuation, working people can have a decent retirement, too. Ending centuries of age-related poverty is one of the biggest examples of social progress in our nation’s history.

Dare I say, giving people a couple of extra decades of economic security through superannuation has probably advanced the sum total of human happiness more than just about anything else an Australian government has done.

How otherwise sensible people could be opposed to this step forward for our society really is beyond me.

It shows you just how easy it is to forget the realities of life in the past – especially when you have a vested interest or ideological obsession in forgetting.

Ideological opposition

That’s where most of the opposition to industry superannuation is coming from: A small minority with ideological opposition to the equal representation model of unions and employers on a profit-to-member basis.

The main point to grasp is that the performance of industry superannuation funds isn’t what motivates them – because their performance is consistently superior to that of the retail funds. They just think that if unions are involved, it must be illegitimate.

Well, industry super is now middle-aged and after 40 years the first cohort of members who have had industry super for their whole working lives are starting to retire.

Ordinary people understand gains

This is why the opposition to industry super is doomed – ordinary people know what benefits it produces. And those with 40-year-old balances, built up by compounding interest during this era of steady and sometimes accelerated economic growth, are increasing in number every year.

That still isn’t stopping its opponents from trying to pull industry super down.

Without financial arguments to fall back upon, they are resorting to crude and misleading populist arguments that are getting more strident and desperate with every silly campaign. It takes several forms.

On the political right, the current argument of choice involves housing.

Putting money into super, they say, is stopping young people saving for a house. And if only those young people could get their hands on the super in their balances, they could go out and bid more for a house each Saturday morning.

But of course all this will do is bid up the price of housing, and rob them of compounding interest over their working life, meaning they will be worse off and even more exposed to the ups and downs of the housing market. Super helps them diversify their assets – a good thing if ever there was one.

This choice between a retirement and a house is a false choice indeed.

But one can see why the opponents of industry use it.

It’s emotive – and as we know emotion is easier to create than understanding. They know it’s a bloody brave politician who will tell millennials they have to choose between saving for a house and retirement.

But brave they must be, because raiding super for housing is like shutting down schools to pay for hospitals.

Sound investment decisions

The right’s other argument is that superannuation balances are being turned into piggy banks for do-gooders to raid for their pet schemes, like public housing and industry investment.

All funds are required by law to make investment decisions based on their projected returns to members. This law hasn’t changed and never will. Industry funds would never stand for such a change. Never.

On the left, different but no less populist and misleading arguments are being employed with increasing frequency.

One is that industry super, in fact all super, is a neoliberal plot that has effectively privatised the aged pension.

This is another nonsense. Industry superannuation didn’t come at the expense of the pension—the pension was raised significantly during its period of creation, as were other benefits to seniors. The dual existence of industry superannuation and a significantly higher aged pension is a double buffer against the vicissitudes of old age.

In the long-term, this so-called progressive populist critique of industry superannuation is as dangerous as the conservative populist critique it imitates. It’s a case of different sheep costumes but essentially the same wolf.

Far better off

Australians and Australia are far better off for four decades of the equal employer union representation model on a profit-to-member basis.

With each passing year, its future will be more certain, but there is still much work to do to combat the dangerous myths peddled by its opponents.

Fighting back against these misleading campaigns is one of the most important things for Industry fund leaders can do.

Wayne Swan is chair of Cbus. He was also Treasurer of Australia, and Deputy Prime Minister of Australia in the Gillard and Rudd Labor governments.’

For more related articles and blogs on Ageing Democracy, Australian Politics, Demography, Finance, Government Budgets, Koch Network, Pensions, Superannuation and Younger Generations click through:

Baby Boomer Bomb or Bubble is Ending – Retirement Income Planning

Population Pyramids, Economics, Ageing, Pensions, Demography and Misunderstanding Data Sets

Population Decline and Effects on Taxation, Benefits, Economy and Society

Pension Systems and Budget Sustainability

Immigration Population Growth Decline NOM Net Overseas Migration

Japan – Australia: Ageing Populations – Demographic Socio Political Comparison

Japan – Australia: Ageing Populations – Demographic Socio Political Comparison

From ANU Australian National University’s East Asia Forum, articles on the issue of demography, ageing, electoral and social security in Japan ‘The problematic politics of Japan’s ageing electorate’ and Australia ‘Maintaining Australia’s status as an immigration nation’. 

Both nations, like elsewhere, are ageing, but dealing with campaigns opposed to immigration to ameliorate working, tax revenue and budget stress, while many retired and elderly voters have short term horizons or simply vote for their own future security.

However, as this issue continues to become significant, especially Japan, there is little political will to deal with it openly and honestly, hence, working age and younger generations will need to deal with it, while having low expectations of state social security support.  

Meanwhile in Australia, there has been two decades of nativist ‘dog whistling’ (undefined) immigration and population growth, via legacy and independent media to persuade voters, yet media and policy makers seem not to understand the demographics, immigration, population and economic effects?

While there is below replacement fertility, fewer youth, working age has passed the ‘demographic sweet spot’, more retirees and increasing old age dependency ratios, that should settle by mid century; in the meantime temporary net migration inc. international students, maintain the working age cohort, pay taxes and for services, while supporting budget health.

‘The problematic politics of Japan’s ageing electorate’

27 February 2023

Author: Yasuo Takao, Curtin University

Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida used a policy speech at the opening of the 2023 session of Japan’s parliament, the National Diet, to declare that Japan was ‘on the brink of not being able to maintain social functions’ due to the country’s population crisis. The country’s median age is 49 — the second highest in the world.

In the 2021 House of Representatives election, the median age of those who cast a vote was 59. The centre of gravity of Japanese electoral politics has shifted from taxpayers to pensioners, with the potential of the elderly exerting more political pressure over policymakers as the population ages.

The majoritarian decision-making model suggests that self-interested aging voters are likely to support increasingly generous social benefits for themselves, even at the expense of other generations.

In Japan, voter turnout has consistently been higher and is steadily increasing among older people. The age gap in Japan’s voter turnout is exceptionally high, with an OECD study finding a gap of 25 percentage points in voter turnout between voters 55 and older and voters under 35, compared with the OECD average of 12 points. Assuming that high turnout is a reflection of political interest, this implies that elderly voters influence politics in a self-interested way, to the detriment of younger generations.

But no studies have yet found clear evidence of such self-interest among Japan’s elderly voters. In the early 2000s, the Japanese public became seriously concerned about the country’s apparently unsustainable level of social security expenditure. The elderly, more than any other cohort of the population, consider social security issues to be important factors in casting their votes.

Japan’s older people may not be as explicitly self-interested as the median voter model would predict. A series of surveys conducted by Japan’s Cabinet Office and Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare found that elderly respondents supported policy constraints on social security just as much as other age cohorts.

Internationally, the Japanese elderly are seen as more accepting of intergenerational equity than the elderly in other countries. Cross-national surveys on those 60 and older, conducted by the Cabinet Office in 2005, 2010, 2015 and 2020, asked whether government policy should prioritise younger people over older people or vice versa. Japan had the highest percentage — 31 per cent — of respondents agreeing that ‘young people should be prioritised’ —compared to 14 per cent in the United States and 17 per cent in both Germany and Sweden.

On this evidence, self-interested voters seeking to maximise their own benefits seems less applicable in the case of the Japanese welfare state. But other factors might also be at play..

The primary factor influencing public attitudes toward social security is demographic changes. In the early 2000s, the urgent need for social security reform in response to Japan’s population crisis captured public attention. The debate that followed played a significant role in influencing the attitudes of the elderly toward social security benefits.

There is undoubtedly a distinctive generational difference in political attitudes. The dankai baby boomer cohort born between 1947 and 1949 experienced turbulent events in their youth — Japan’s rapid economic growth, anti-establishment student movements, industrial pollution and the Vietnam War among them. These dankai-specific experiences bred life-long progressive political attitudes and a propensity to embrace the common good rather than sectional interests. In the 2009 general election a plurality of 49 per cent of voters aged 60–69 voted for the Democratic Party of Japan, which toppled the conservative Liberal Democratic Party.

Japan’s elderly cohort also has the highest labour-force participation among the OECD countries. Nearly half of Japanese men aged 60–70 and one quarter of those aged 70–75 are still in the workforce. About three-quarters of the Japanese elderly workforce work in non-regular positions and consider social security issues important to their votes.

Despite having less secure employment, elderly voters do not necessarily influence politics in a self-interested way to the detriment of younger generations. Employed elderly people continue to find security in belonging to a particular company, which dissuades them from organising around their own interests with others beyond their company ties. Employed elderly people are more likely to identify with the interests of their younger co-workers.

Japan’s public, mandatory long-term care insurance has had a significant impact on the elderly. The dramatic rise of the costs of its operation has undermined its fiscal stability and this universal system weakens the interest in political activism by the elderly. Eligibility is not based on income or family situation but purely on age and physical and mental health.

Anyone 65 or older, plus those aged 40–64 with aging-related diseases, are eligible for institutional or community-based care.

Self-employed individuals, of whom 40 per cent are 65 or older and have no mandatory retirement age, hold opinions aligned with the protection of their small businesses, often against the interests of elderly consumption.

The aging of the Japanese electorate may not have led to politically charged generosity for the elderly at the expense of younger generations, but there are still many puzzles to unravel about how the elderly in Japan are affecting policy choices and political outcomes.

Yasuo Takao is Adjunct Senior Research Fellow at the School of Media, Culture and Creative Arts, Curtin University, Perth.

‘Maintaining Australia’s status as an immigration nation’

20 May 2023

Authors: Stephen Clibborn and Chris F Wright, University of Sydney

Australia has been widely regarded internationally as an exemplary ‘nation of immigrants’, with migration policies that effectively serve the national interest. But since the mid-1990s, Australia’s migration system has shifted away from the long-term provision of skills for nation-building towards a guest worker model aimed at satisfying the short-term demands of business.

The current migration system inefficiently supplies skills, exposes temporary migrants to underpayment and mistreatment and poorly serves the national interest. It has disintegrated to a point where the recent Parkinson Review of the Migration System and Home Affairs Minister Clare O’Neil declared it ‘broken’ and in need of an overhaul.

The Parkinson Review identified three general principles to return to a sound migration system: tripartite involvement of unions and employer associations with government in designing and implementing policy, universality of regulation for migrants and mobility for migrants to transfer between employers. The government announced it will now undertake a major reform of the migration system using input from the Parkinson Review.

The government’s single concrete immediate policy announcement in response to the review was increasing the Temporary Skilled Migration Income Threshold (TSMIT), which was justified on grounds that it would help reduce exploitation of workers. This policy increases the effective minimum pay rate for some classes of migrant workers from AU$53,900, where it has languished since 2013, to AU$70,000. That means employers sponsoring temporary migrant workers under the Temporary Skill Shortage scheme from 1 July 2023 must pay a minimum annual salary of AU$70,000. This is a compromise between recommendations from business groups — AU$63,000 — and the Australian Council of Trade Unions — AU$90,000.

The government has stated that simplifying the migration system, delivering skills needed by business and reducing exploitation of migrant workers are its main priorities. Many of the Parkinson Review’s recommendations will help achieve these goals. Recommendations such as removing restrictions on temporary skilled migrants’ mobility between employers and independent assessment of skills demand are helpful. But other recommendations potentially undermine them, such as continued reliance on the TSMIT and creating three tiers of temporary labour migration. This may further complicate the system, reduce labour supply and maintain exploitation.

Historical and comparative research suggests that the government’s goals can be best achieved by strengthening ties between migration and employment regulations. Many problems with the migration system can be traced back to the expansion of temporary visas in 1996. Prior to this, the migration system was relatively simple. It supplied skills to business efficiently and migrant worker exploitation was lower. Complementary migration and employment regulations contributed to these outcomes.

Three changes would better align migration and employment regulations.

First, abandon the TSMIT pay threshold. Minister O’Neil’s headline policy announcement — raising the TSMIT — places excessive faith in salary level as a measure of skill and worker power. The Parkinson Review’s recommendation to build a three-tier system of employment regulation around salary levels does likewise on the basis that those workers paid above the TSMIT are likely to be at limited risk of exploitation. The policy focus should not be on the level of the threshold but its very existence.

For many years, Australia’s Minister for Home Affairs has had the power to set the TSMIT, resulting in pay rates being determined by political considerations rather than labour market assessments. This contrasts with the methodical and transparent way the Fair Work Commission’s Expert Panels set minimum wages.

Maintaining the TSMIT risks reinforcing separate labour markets for migrants and citizens, undermining the government’s objectives. An increased TSMIT could also price out some skilled jobs in sectors with pronounced labour demand, such as health, social care and hospitality. This would likely generate political pressure for new job-specific visas to address Australia’s skill needs, further complicating the migration system.

Second, independently assess skills needs. The Parkinson Review recommended using Jobs and Skills Australia, a new Commonwealth agency, to better align migration and labour market regulations. This agency will help to ensure migration better complements the education and training system. For decades these policy areas have been at cross-purposes, despite their mutual objectives of supplying necessary skills.

Using Jobs and Skills Australia to strengthen coordination between migration, on one hand, and education and training, on the other, will help ensure skills and workforce needs are assessed and addressed more reliably. This approach will give employers more confidence to invest in developing their workforces.

Third, enforce employment regulations more effectively. Without this, unscrupulous employers will continue to underpay and mistreat vulnerable temporary migrants, gaining a competitive advantage over honest operators. Without effective enforcement, businesses are discouraged from seeking to succeed through quality, innovation and productivity improvements, which are essential for Australia’s international competitiveness. The assumption that a certain level of pay in the TSMIT and a proposed higher-paid visa tier equates to individual worker power to resist underpayment is misplaced.

In implementing the Parkinson Review’s recommendations, the government must ensure migration regulations are better integrated with wider employment regulations. This will help achieve the government’s triple goals of simplifying the system, supplying skills more effectively and reducing worker exploitation. This will ensure the migration system continues to support Australia’s international standing as a successful ‘nation of immigrants’.

Stephen Clibborn is an Associate Professor and Co-Director of the Sydney Employment Relations Research Group at the University of Sydney Business School, University of Sydney.

Chris F Wright is an Associate Professor and Co-Director of the Sydney Employment Relations Research Group at the University of Sydney Business School, University of Sydney.

For related links and article on Ageing Democracy, Australian Immigration News, Demography, Government Budgets, Pensions, Taxation and Younger Generations click through:

Population Pyramids, Economics, Ageing, Pensions, Demography and Misunderstanding Data Sets

Australian Migration Review 2023 – For Immigrants and Nation or a Nativist Trap?

Global Population Decline and Impacts

Population Decline in Asia is Near with Africa to Follow

Population Decline and Effects on Taxation, Benefits, Economy and Society

Grey Tsunami – Electoral Demographics – Ageing Populations vs. Youth

Ageing Democracy, Nativism and Populism

EU & Anglosphere – Refugees – Border Walls vs. Working Age Decline

While media, governments, think tanks, NGOs and politicians highlight, stress about, gaslight and promote negative tactics to stop refugees e.g. British government’s policies on channel crossings and using Rwanda as an offshore detention centre, there are gaps growing in the working age cohort due to demographic decline.

Not only is much of agitprop this drawn from old ideology by right wing or nativist politicians, while holding libertarian views on much else, a clear need for temporary and/or permanent immigration to plug employment gaps, pay taxes and support budgets for more retirees and pensioners using social services, is apparent.

Good examples are Britain and other OECD nations which share below replacement fertility, fewer youth and demographic decline in working age i.e. has passed the ‘demographic sweet spot’, but more retirees and ever increasing old age dependency ratios.

In short, we need well and better supported budgets for more retirees needing the support but they vote against their own interests e.g. Brexit?

See OECD data here on working age trends.

OECD (2023), Working age population (indicator). doi: 10.1787/d339918b-en (Accessed on 20 March 2023) 

However, nativist politics and talking points, targeting older voters on refugees, immigration, population growth and purported negative issues, then precludes the solutions i.e.  increase net migration, temporary or seasonal workers as ‘net financial budget contributors’ and more modest numbers of permanent migrants, going onto citizenship. 

Following analysis explains immigration and employment issues for the EU, from The EU Observer:

‘On migration, Europe needs to pivot from walls to work

By MICHELE LEVOY   BRUSSELS, 16. FEB, 07:00

It’s not news that Europe wants fewer migrants reaching its borders. What is less visible is that at the same time Europe is scrambling to get more migrants — to fill dramatic labour shortages, with little consideration for workers’ and human rights. The approach so far has been hypocritical, harmful — and self-defeating.

EU migration policies have long been promoting a narrative of migration as a threat, and something that should be tackled with a defensive and punitive approach.

The 2020 EU Migration Pact, still under negotiation, is billed as overhauling the EU migration system, but instead just expands existing measures like detention for anyone coming to Europe via irregular routes, including children, and speeding up deportations, while lowering human rights safeguards.

The never-ending fight against irregular migration

Last week, the European Council asked the Commission to fund border surveillance technology and to step up the use of visa agreements as a tool to pressure other countries into accepting swifter and more deportations of their citizens. Throughout 2022, several agreements were struck to increase joint policing at common borders, including between France and the UK, Germany and Switzerland, and Czechia and Slovakia.

The proposed revision of the Schengen Borders Code would allow border guards to stop and check people crossing borders internally within the EU if they believe that the individuals can’t prove their right to enter the country. There is little doubt that this amounts to legitimising racial profiling.

The demand for workforce

While Europe cracks down on migration, it also discreetly tries to get more migrants to fill ever more dramatic labour shortages in key sectors from hospitality to construction, from transportation to health care.

In practice, this means granting residence permits to people already living in the country through ongoing or new regularisation mechanisms, and creating work permits for people to come to work in the EU from abroad. Yet many of these measures may be driven by the demand for workforce, with little attention for workers’ rights.

France is negotiating a regularisation scheme for shortage occupations — but it’s been criticised for focusing on workers employed in the most physically demanding professions, while leaving out other key sectors and skills.

In January 2023, the right-wing Italian government increased the number of available permits for non-EU workers from 69,700 in 2022 to 82,705 but more than half are for seasonal work, which is often extremely precarious and rife with exploitation.

The 2020 Italian regularisation was largely prompted by fears that the country’s fields would remain without workers due to COVID-19 restrictions on international travel. The regularisation kept workers dependent on their employers, and conditions to apply were extremely strict and burdensome. The result is that only a third of the applicants managed to regularise their stay….’

For more articles about Ageing Democracy, Demography, EU European Union, Immigration, Media, Pensions, Tanton Network and White Nationalism:

Immigration to Australia – More Opportunities for Temporary Residents?

Collective Narcissism, Ageing Electorates, Pensioner Populism, White Nativism and Autocracy

Narcissistic Political Leaders – NPD Narcissistic Personality Disorder – Collective Narcissism – Cognitive Dissonance – Conspiracy Theories – Populism

Ageing Democracy, Nativism and Populism

Economic Research – No Negative Relationship with Immigration and Wages, Income or Employment

Global Population Decline and Impacts

The developed world zeitgeist, especially Anglosphere, is that population growth has been one of the key issues of environmental sustainability and nativist conservative politics, left and right.  However, as the article from First Links below explains, we are in fact approaching peak population, due to below replacement fertility and to be followed by ageing and decline, or balance?

Many are realising that ‘population growth’ is not such an issue, it has stalled with long term fertility decline (below replacement), while recent analysis suggests peak mid century (Lancet etc.) while researchers Bricker & Ibbitson (‘Empty Planet’) predict precipitous decline after the peak.

The headline number is not the issue but as the late Hans Rosling said, it’s the make-up and how the population is managed at different life stages e.g. oldies now outnumber youth which has electoral repercussions when voting for short term horizons aka Brexit.

Population obsessions, have also been used to support an unsubstantiated environmental link of ‘sciency sounding’ PR that deflects from carbon regulation, fossil fuels, often blames ‘immigration’ to at least preserve the status quo; from the time of Malthus and Galton through ZPG, and the UNPD (whose formulae are used by ABS & UK too).

The issue is not just skills gaps nor is demanding all retirees continue to work (involuntarily), but how to fund budgets when we are dependent upon taxes from working age and temporary churnover via PAYE system, but these cohorts are in decline viz a viz increasing numbers of retirees?

OECD demographic data, i.e. medium to long term trends of working age/retirees + kids, is more informative and gives comparisons with other nations, vs. our obsessions with short term headline NOM net overseas migration data snapshots that make for media headlines (but normally dominated by students and backpackers).

Quite obvious, like elsewhere, temporary churn over is important, as ‘net financial contributors’ to support budgets, when more retirees/pensioners are tugging on the same with ageing declining tax payers.

Click through to see OECD Australian working age demographics with other comparable nations. 

All have passed the ‘demographic sweet spot’, hence, how can budgets be supported further? Increase taxes for low income types and/or retirees (mooted in the US by some in the GOP), or cut services and health care, or privatise more services for user pays (political suicide)?

From First Links Newsletter Australia:

‘Embracing the bright side of population decline

Emma Davidson   30 March 2022

A growing body of research is showing that global population growth is slowing down and will likely drop into negative territory within the next few decades.

One study predicted that the global population would peak at 9.7 billion people in 2064 – up from around 7.9 billion currently – before falling to 8.8 billion by the end of this century. If this is true, it’ll be the first sustained period of world population decline since the Black Death.

But what’s worrying some experts today is that many countries are already seeing natural population growth come to a standstill. Here in Australia, the lack of immigration contributed to population growth of practically zero in the year to March 2021 . Similar stories are playing out in the UK, the US, and many other developed countries.

Shrinking populations and financial markets

What economic impact will these demographics shifts have? After all, we can’t ignore the human aspect of our economies. Financial markets are complex, interconnected ecosystems, and our attitudes and behaviour are key to how they perform.

Well, when it comes to population decline, many analysts are bearish.

They say lower birth rates create ageing nations, with fewer people available to look after the elderly. These stretched workforces limit innovation and productivity. Growing economies need growing populations, it is claimed.

However, I believe this is an overly pessimistic view. I’m far more bullish about the impact of declining populations. There are many possible benefits to having fewer people in the world. And I suspect even the negatives aren’t quite as bad as people suggest, given humans have an incredible knack for adapting to change.

Wage growth

It’s widely thought that a smaller working-age population could lift wages. Fewer workers give the labour market greater bargaining power, leading to better working conditions.

There would also likely be more opportunities for women and ethnic minorities, increasing workforce diversity. Research shows that diverse organisations tend to financially outperform their less inclusive competitors. They are also six times more likely to be innovative and agile.

Economic growth might slow, but it is my hope that the above changes would lead to healthier, happier, and more engaged workers – and a more even wealth distribution.

The late Swedish statistician Hans Rosling argued convincingly for bringing the world’s final 1 billion people out of extreme poverty to limit population growth and provide better opportunities for millions of families who are struggling.

I’m confident that humans can adjust to a ‘new normal’ where economic growth is still a goal, but not the only goal. Instead, perhaps we can focus more on creating a world where living standards and wealth distribution are our barometers of success.

Then, freed from poverty, some people will inevitably go on to become the scientists, entrepreneurs and leaders of tomorrow that we’ll need when populations decline.

Innovation and productivity

The conventional logic is that bigger is better when it comes to population and innovation. More people means more researchers and innovators (as well as more consumers to sell to). And yet, only three of Bloomberg’s top 10 most innovative economies have populations exceeding 10 million people (South Korea, Germany and Sweden).

So, it’s clearly not just a numbers game.

Investing in education and encouraging more people to work in research and development also facilitates the flow of new ideas. Furthermore, automation can accelerate innovation and productivity by performing all of the tedious, time-consuming tasks that would usually fall to humans, freeing them up for more value-oriented work.

Initial predictions for automation were bleak. The ‘rise of the robots’ would mean job losses, economists said, as employers replaced workers en-masse with machines that never get sick or tired.

More recent research is challenging that theory. One study found that each robot per 1,000 employees boosts employment at a firm by 2.2%. Essentially, automation makes companies more competitive and profitable, helping them to grow the business and swell their ranks.

Sustainability matters

It’s common to hear industry commentators make statements like “ignoring the environmental benefits for a moment” or “sustainability aside” when talking about population decline. But we can’t simply forget about the environment. It’s too important. Ever-growing populations continue to put a strain on the world and its resources.

Declining populations can help

Researchers recently calculated that having one child fewer saves approximately 59 tonnes of CO2 emissions per year. “Having one less child saves each parent more than 20 times (of CO2 emissions) as living without a car, or about 70 times as much as eliminating meat from the diet” Sustainable Population Australia says.

To be clear, I’m not advocating that people should stop having children. I have written previously about the potential repercussions of a ‘baby bust’ if rising infertility rates are ignored. In addition, and as things stand right now, the global human population begins to decline at the end of this century and is likely to continue along the decline trajectory.

What I am wanting to highlight is the environmental benefits that are associated with population decline.

Finding the right balance

Of course, there are some roles that robots simply can’t fill. Ageing populations will place more pressure on our healthcare and elderly care systems, for example. And it’s hard to imagine artificial intelligence ever having as good a bedside manner as a real doctor or nurse.

Australia’s healthcare and superannuation systems are excellent, which should relieve some of this burden. But we must also find ways to make certain roles, such as elderly care, more rewarding.

Automation is therefore just one piece of the puzzle. We must also recognise there are complex services that only humans can provide.

There are undoubtedly challenges we face with declining populations, and I don’t pretend to have the answers.

But do our narratives have to be so gloomy? There is far more room for optimism based on the human capacity to adapt.’

Emma Davidson is Head of Corporate Affairs at London-based Staude Capital, manager of the Global Value Fund (ASX:GVF). This article is the opinion of the writer and does not consider the circumstances of any individual.

For more articles and blogs on immigration, population growth, demography and economics click through:

Limits to Growth – Jorgen Randers – Club of Rome

Hans Rosling – GapMinder – Factfulness – Human Development – Adult Education

China PRC – Fertility Decline – Peak Population?

Population Growth or Decline?

Population, Environment and White Nationalists in Australia – US Links