Putin’s Russian Led Corruption of Anglosphere and European Radical Right, Conservatives and Christians

Posted on March 4, 2024 by Andrew Smith

Some years ago Putin and Russia attracted much attention and sympathy from Anglo and European ultra conservative Christians, radical right and free market libertarians for Russia’s corrupt nativist authoritarianism with antipathy towards liberal democracy, the EU and open society.

These phenomena can be observed through visitors and liaisons, but more so by shared talking points and values. These include family values, pro-life, Christianity, patriarchy, misogyny, white supremacy, traditionalism, dominionism, Evangelicals, anti-LGBT, anti-woke, anti-elite, anti-gay marriage, traditional wives etc. and corruption, promoted by right wing parties, media, ultra conservative influencers, think tanks and NGOs.

The latter includes Russian Orthodox Church, ADF Alliance Defending Freedom, WCC World Council of Churches, WCF World Congress of Families, Baptist Convention, CNP Council for National Policy, UK Tories, US GOP, Australian LNP, IDU International Democratic Union, Legatum, Tufton Street London, Heritage Foundation, Danube Institute, Conservatives for Russia, ARC Alliance for Responsible Citizenship, Atlas or Koch Network, Tanton Network, CPAC, Breitbart, Fox News, GB News, Rebel News and a conga line of transnational grifters.

Foremost have been Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump, Viktor Orban, Steve Bannon, Marie Le Pen, Nigel Farage, John Howard, Tony Abbott, Alexander Downer, ‘Moscow Mike’ Flynn, Tucker Carlson, Rupert Murdoch’s Fox News team, Sean Hannity, Boris Johnson, Benjamin Netanyahu et al. with related events including Brexit, Trump, Australia’s Voice Referendum and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

From ECFR European Council on Foreign Relations:

‘Conservatism by decree: Putin as a figurehead for the global far-right

Vladimir Putin is ramping up his radical-right credentials. This reinforces his grip on power in Russia, but it could also increase his influence worldwide

Ksenia Luchenko Visiting Fellow

1 March 2024

In his state of the nation address on 29 February, Vladimir Putin doubled down on a theme that has become familiar to Russians over the past few months: family, or more specifically, “traditional family values”. “Some countries,” he said, “deliberately destroy norms of morality, institutions of the family, push whole peoples towards extinction and degeneration.” Not so in Russia: “we choose life.” The ultraconservatism tied up in this discourse has been central to Putin’s campaign ahead of the Russian election this month – and will shape his fifth term as president that follows.

Putin has long promoted the narrative that “traditional values” are what differentiate Russia from the “satanic West”. But Putin’s brand of conservatism is in keeping with a wider political trend, rooted in the right-Christian agenda that formed during the US culture wars of the late 20th century. According to the political scientist Gionathan Lo Mascolo, the shift comprises “two major colliding phenomena: the politicization of religion, often driven by religious actors, leaders, and institutions; and the sacralization of politics, driven by far-right parties and actors”.

This “moralist international” is made up of far-right populists spanning the American and European continents (and their companions in assorted churches). Donald Trump and his acolytes, of course. But also, for example, Brazil’s former president Jair Bolsonaro, who combined idolisation of “the traditional Brazilian family” with religious and nationalistic sloganeering to help erode years of social progress in the country. Viktor Orban’s Hungary follows a similar pattern.

But Putin has power to implement his domestic agenda that his American and European counterparts can only dream of, unconstrained by law, opposition, or public opinion. Just as Bolshevism in the Soviet Union was a radical, fundamentalist interpretation of socialism, Russia now pushes moral traditionalism to the extreme. The president hands down one decree after another to regulate morality and ethics, and demonstrates his power over the private lives of his citizens. In doing so, he not only positions himself as a leader in an alternative (authoritarian) global order, but also stamps out liberal life in Russia and strengthens his autocracy.

Last year saw a spike in ideologically driven lawmaking in Russia, with women and the LGBT+ community, especially transgender people, emerging as key targets. Gender transition – both surgical procedures and hormonal therapy, along with changing one’s gender on official documents – was completely banned. Those who had already transitioned were forbidden from adopting children. On November 30, the Russian Supreme Court declared the non-existent “International LGBT Movement” an extremist organisation and prohibited its activities. Essentially, same-sex relationships are now illegal, as are any symbols associated with the ‘movement’, including rainbow earrings and My Little Pony.

Another key theme is pro-natalism. A bill prohibiting the promotion of childlessness is currently under consideration in the Duma, stating voluntary childlessness “goes against traditional family values and the state policy of the Russian Federation”. But on abortion, authorities have yet to arrive at a definitive stance. Some regions have instituted penalties for “encouraging abortion” and engaging in the “propagation of abortions”. This was followed by a Ministry of Health directive limiting access to emergency contraception. Then, in November 2023, Patriarch Kirill, the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, petitioned Vyacheslav Volodin, Chair of the State Duma, seeking endorsement for the prohibition of abortions within private clinics.

However, during a press conference in December, Putin called for a circumspect approach to the abortion issue, asserting that the solution lies in a “return to traditional values … and in the sphere of material well-being.” Subsequently, the State Duma health committee rebuffed support for a federal ban on abortions within private clinics.

As with all potentially sensitive governance decisions that affect the populace (such as pandemic restrictions and mobilisation), Russia is experiencing what political analyst Ekaterina Shulman terms “paradoxical federalisation” – a devolution of responsibility from the federal centre to lower levels; regional authorities shoulder the burden of unpopular decisions, shielding the president from direct association.

Moreover, Putin has begun to break taboos on interference in the private, relational sphere. Until recently, Russian society had operated under an unspoken rule of family inviolability and non-publicity. The public should not intrude in the family life of the president and top officials, and they broadly returned the favour. That is, there was no physical belonging of citizens to the state. Even following Putin’s “gay propaganda” law in 2013, people were generally left alone to live their lives if they did so in private. But now the rules have changed.

Since the start of the war, officials have found a new way to express their loyalty to the president: the adoption of children abducted from the occupied territories of Ukraine.

Reliable evidence exists for two such cases. Sergei Mironov, head of the Just Russia party and a member of the State Duma, and his wife took two children from the Kherson region and adopted them, changing their names. And Russian children’s rights ombudsman, Maria Lvova-Belova, who shares an International Court of Justice arrest warrant with Putin for illegal deportations of Ukrainian children, adopted a teenager from Mariupol. Lvova-Belova did so publicly, normalising her crime. Mironov hides the expansion of his family, but it follows the same trend: the intimate lives of people who pursue political careers is now subordinated to state interests.

And this change is not limited to political elites. Addressing municipal deputies in January, Putin alluded disparagingly to people who “jump around without pants at parties”, contrasting them with the supposed piety of the military. This intervention seemingly condemned Russian celebrities who participated in a private “almost naked” party in December, organised by popular blogger and influencer Anastasia Ivleeva. After semi-nude photos of the celebrities surfaced on social media, they faced a wave of criticism for immoral behavior and persecution by law enforcement. Similar cases have begun to occur in other cities, where attendees of private parties have been accused of “anti-Christian propaganda” and “gay propaganda”.

Private morality and ethics have thus become subjects of state interest – and the president himself has confirmed it. Given that liberals in Russia tend to be more pro-Western, it all contributes to his long campaign to obliterate any remaining pockets of dissent.

But by ramping up his far-right credentials in this way, Putin also aims to win (and win back) friends abroad, especially where Russia and Russian Orthodoxy have historically had a strong presence – for instance, in EU candidate countries Serbia, Georgia, and Moldova. There, pro-Russian political forces garner support in part through their hostility towards feminism, abortion, and the LGBT+ community. Georgia and Moldova will head to the polls this year – and Russian propaganda will use the full range of anti-Western rhetoric to increase its influence and weaken these countries’ support for Ukraine.

Indeed, Russian journalist Mikhael Zygar has argued that Putin’s far-right positioning is a form of statecraft, aimed mainly at this external audience. Putin thus builds Russian influence by adopting trends from the very West that he rails against. He seems to want to show his current and potential allies that an alternative to democracy exists, one that allows for the disregard of human rights and international law in pursuit of “traditional values”. In this way, he sets himself up as a figurehead for the informal international conservative alliance – a political and societal network that unites right-conservative forces worldwide.’

The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. ECFR publications only represent the views of their individual authors.

For more related blogs and article on topics including Conservative, Demography, EU European Union, Evangelical Christianity, Koch Network, Media, Political Strategy, Populist Politics, Russia, Tanton Network and White Nationalism click through:

Russia and Anglosphere – Conservatives and Oligarchs – War vs EU and Future

Very good insight into and overview of Putin’s Russia and the ‘west’ including the Anglosphere from Alexander Etkin (CEU Wien) in Russia’s War Against Modernity.

Following are significant excerpts from Etkind’s analysis from reviewer at Inside Story (Australia) Jon Richardson, on how it endeavours to explain Russia, and one would add many other nations too, mirroring the radical right or corrupt nativist authoritarians with support from fossil fuels & industry oligarchs, consolidated right wing media, think tanks and leveraging ageing electorates.

Alliance for Responsible Citizenship ARC and Anglo Right Wing Grifters

Another nativist Christian front promoting a conference with a whiff of fossil fuels, climate science denial with Anglosphere right wing grifters and ‘freedom and liberty’ supported by Legatum, and no doubt indirectly linked to Koch Network, like Brexit and its deep pocketed foreign supporters.

Alexander Downer – Donald Trump aide George Papadopoulos – Russian Influence?

Alexander Downer, former Australian Foreign Minister in Conservative LNP coalition, Australia’s UK High Commissioner till 2018, visitor to Koch Network Heritage Foundation linked Hungarian Danube Institute (with former PM, now GWPF, UK Trade Advisor and Murdochs’ new Fox Board member Tony Abbott), and source for claims by Trump related people of DNC emails stolen by Russians i.e. George Papadopoulos.

‘Just a diplomat doing his job? A new book puts the spotlight back on Australia, Russia and interference in the US election.’

Historical Influence and Links Between Russia and the US Christian Right

We observe in the Anglosphere resurgence in conservative Christian nationalism of the right, becoming a central issue in ageing electorates, more in the US, Russia and Central Europe; both an electoral and policy strategy, plus supporting beliefs.

Some of the Anglo links are former Australian PM and now UK Trade Advisor Tony Abbott with the ADF Alliance Defending Freedom, Donald Trump gaining support of Evangelical and ‘pro-life’ Christians, the fossil fueled Atlas or Koch Network and their influence on the conservative Christian CNP Council for National Policy, Koch influenced Federalist Society promoting ‘pro-life’ choices for SCOTUS on Roe vs. Wade, then sharing similar values with Orban et al. in Central Europe, and Putin in Russia too?

Nigel Farage – Julian Assange – Wikileaks – Trump Campaign – Russian Influence

In the Anglosphere there is still much confusion around Assange, Wikileaks, stolen DNC emails, Russian influence, Russia Report, Mueller Report, Trump campaign, Murdoch’s Fox News, Nigel Farage, Roger Stone, Cambridge Analytica, Tufton St. think tanks linked to Atlas or Koch Network, Steve Bannon and right wing grifters, out to defeat Hillary Clinton’s Democratic Presidential Campaign in 2016.

Putin’s Supporters in Europe and Anglosphere: Willing Dupes and Useful Idiots?

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Posted on May 1, 2023 by Andrew Smith

Article from the ECFR European Council on Foreign Relations in 2016 describing those aligned or allied with Putin’s Russia on both the European left and right, while the latter are adopted or supported by Putin’s Russia, with recommendations on what Europe could do, warning of Russia’s covert support for populist parties; post Brexit, pre Trump and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

‘Putin’s friends in Europe

The upsurge of populism in Europe has provided Russia with an ample supply of sympathetic political parties across the continent.

Fredrik Wesslau 19 October 2016

The upsurge of populism in Europe has provided Russia with an ample supply of sympathetic political parties across the continent. These parties – mostly from the far right but also from the far left – are pursuing policies and taking positions that advance Russia’s agenda in Europe. They tend to be anti-establishment parties ― some on the extreme fringes of the political spectrum ― that challenge the mainstream liberal order in Europe. Many of these parties are working actively to undo the European project. They are generally suspicious of the United States and want to reduce its influence in Europe.

In June ECFR carried out the first comprehensive survey of ‘insurgent’ parties in Europe. It found that, despite their differences, a majority of them are positively inclined towards Putin’s Russia and pursue policies that promote Russia’s interests in Europe.

While Russia is not responsible for the emergence of these pro-Russian parties, it has embraced them, especially as relations between the West and Russia have deteriorated. The parties are useful for Moscow in that they help legitimise the Kremlin’s policies and amplify Russian disinformation. At times they can also shift Europe’s domestic debates in Russia’s favour. But it is their politics of disruption – underpinned by their scepticism towards the European Union – that does most to destabilise European politics.

It would be a mistake to portray these parties as Russian stooges. The parties’ pro-Russian policies are underpinned by conviction and an affinity with ideological tenets of Putin’s Russia. But while the parties are not under Moscow’s control, the extent to which Russia directly supports them has become an increasingly important question, as tensions rise between Russia and the West. Russian influencing efforts in the West have come under particular scrutiny since the leak of thousands of Democratic National Committee emails in July was attributed to Russian meddling in US politics.

Alignment with Russia

To what extent do the insurgent parties align with Russia? A majority of the 45 insurgent parties identified by ECFR were favourably inclined towards Russia and sympathised with Russian positions. The most pro-Russian of these parties (of a significant size) on the far right are: the AfD, FPÖ, Greece’s Golden Dawn, Hungary’s Jobbik, France’s Front National, Italy’s Northern League, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), and Belgium’s Vlaams Belang (VB). On the far left, the most pro-Russian parties are Cyprus’s AKEL, Germany’s Die Linke, the Czech Republic’s KSCM, Podemos in Spain, and Syriza. The Italian Five Star Movement and the Human Shield Party in Croatia also belong to the pro-Russian camp.

Voting patterns in the European Parliament shows that on issues such as Ukraine, the human rights situation in Russia, and association agreements with Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, the Dutch PVV leads the pack in pro-Russian votes. UKIP, the Sweden Democrats, Italy’s Northern League, and France’s Front National come in a shared second place. Insurgent parties from the far left – Spain’s Podemos, Greece’s Syriza, and Germany’s Die Linke – are not far behind.

All of these parties, with the exception of Syriza and PVV, oppose EU sanctions on Russia and none believe that the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) with Ukraine should be implemented in full. All the parties are Eurosceptic to varying degrees.

The pro-Russian stance of these parties derives largely from conviction and from an ideological affinity with Putin’s Russia. On the far right, many are attracted to Russia’s socially conservative values, its defence of national sovereignty, and its rejection of liberal internationalism and interventionism. On the left, many of the insurgents are attracted by Russia’s antipathy towards globalisation and its challenge to the US-dominated international capitalist order, as well as a nostalgic link to the Soviet Union. Both fringes tend to see Russia as a counter to the United States.

Friends with benefits

These parties have proven useful to Moscow in various ways. They have provided convenient sources of legitimisation domestically – and to some extent internationally – on issues such as Crimea. The Kremlin is able to point to them as “evidence” of Russia not being isolated and of there being supportive voices in Europe. This was seen during the referendum in Crimea in March 2014. While the OCSE did not send observers to Crimea, a group of European politicians from far right parties, including from the FPÖ, VB, FN, Jobbik, and Northern League, went there as observers. This was presented by Moscow as international legitimisation of the referendum.

They have also proven capable of shifting the centre of political discourse in Russia’s favour. In France, for example, former president and presidential hopeful, Nicolas Sarkozy, who belongs to the political mainstream has taken an increasingly sympathetic line towards Russia as presidential elections in 2017 approach. He has called for the lifting of sanctions against Russia and argued that Crimea has a right to become part of Russia. This line is part of his election strategy to adopt positions from the National Front in order to co-opt their votes.

But it is not just in matters of policy that these parties’ sympathies with the Kremlin are revealed. In them Moscow has also found convenient and willing conveyors of its anti-Western, anti-globalisation narratives. Several of the far right leaders, such as Nigel Farage, Geert Wilders and Marine Le Pen, are frequent guests on Russia Today (RT) and Sputnik, with Farage reportedly having been offered his own show on RT.

The “Operation Liza” case in Germany, where a false Russian story of a 13-year-old Russian-German girl having been raped by immigrants was picked up and spread by members of the far right AfD and Die Linke, which has close ties to Germans of Russian descent, was a prime example of the role these parties play in amplifying Russian disinformation.

Finally, the anti-EU and anti-NATO strand of insurgent parties benefits Russia by weakening Western consensus and institutions. The Dutch referendum on the EU’s association agreement with Ukraine in April 2016 was an example of how insurgents in the minority were able to obstruct EU policy to Russia’s benefit. But this was most clearly seen in UKIP’s leading role in Britain’s decision to leave the European Union, with several Eurosceptic parties in Europe now following in UKIP’s footsteps and pushing for their own referendums on EU membership. Several parties, including AKEL, Die Linke, FPÖ, Golden Dawn, KSCM, and Jobbik are also opposed to the NATO alliance.

Russian support and the populist upsurge

But while it is clear that Moscow benefits from the pro-Russian stance of populist parties in Europe and in some cases uses them for propaganda purposes, it is less clear to what extent there is collusion. The notion that Russia might be funding agents of influence by providing financing to sympathetic parties in Europe has become more salient as relations between Russia and the West have deteriorated.

The most well-publicised case of a European political party receiving funding from Russia is the loan to Front National, which has aligned itself with Russia on a range of issues. It has recognised Russia’s annexation of Crimea and event sent observers to the Crimean referendum, providing international legitimisation for the Kremlin.

Leaked SMS exchanges indicate that the Front National’s stance on Crimea was the subject of correspondence between Russian officials, who agreed that the party should be “thanked” somehow for recognising the results of the referendum in Crimea. While Front National has denied that there was any quid pro quo, eight months later the party received a loan of €9.46 million from the First Czech Russian National Bank ― a financial institution with links to the Kremlin. Marine Le Pen has publicly acknowledged the loan – equivalent to the Front National’s total revenue for 2013 – citing the party’s inability to secure financing from European sources.

The founder of Front National, Jean-Marie Le Pen, has also received a €2.5 million loan through his company Cotelec, from a Cyprus-based company that is owned by a former KGB agent who was expelled from Britain in 1985 on charges of spying.

The loans to Front National seem to be a rare case of acknowledged Russian financing of a party. But does it amount to collusion? Not necessarily since Front National would probably have taken pro-Russian positions in any case. But the money does act as an enabler.

There is circumstantial evidence and rumours of covert support for other radical parties in Europe, but little solid evidence exists in the public domain. The lack of information may not be surprising since this sort of activity typically belongs to the opaque world of intelligence services.

But even if one assumes that Russia does not provide financial support to any other party, the way Moscow uses them to legitimise its own narrative and spread disinformation is in itself a cause for concern. They become ― wittingly or unwittingly ― part of an increasingly assertive and hostile Russian foreign policy towards the West.

So what should Europe do?

To begin with, European leaders should recognise that dealing with domestic populism is the greater challenge. Today, anti-establishment politics are a fact throughout Europe. And the political tides are still moving in their direction; several more may find themselves empowered after elections in Germany, France, Netherlands, and possibly Italy, in 2017.

But while Russia is not behind the growth of populism, it is certainly benefiting from it. Insurgent parties have a right to take positions that align with those of Russia, within the limits of democratic politics. But covert Russian actions to support these parties and to spread disinformation undermine the democratic basis of European societies.

European law enforcement agencies should prioritise looking into Russian covert support for populist parties and taking steps to counter such support. European governments should consider publishing intelligence on this in the public domain. Voters have a right to be informed about whom they are voting for.

European governments should introduce stricter regulation of political party financing, notably when that financing is from foreign sources, and increased transparency requirements in relation to funding. A stricter implementation of national corruption and money laundering legislation would also go some way to countering illegal money transfers.’