Japan – Australia: Ageing Populations – Demographic Socio Political Comparison

From ANU Australian National University’s East Asia Forum, articles on the issue of demography, ageing, electoral and social security in Japan ‘The problematic politics of Japan’s ageing electorate’ and Australia ‘Maintaining Australia’s status as an immigration nation’. 

Both nations, like elsewhere, are ageing, but dealing with campaigns opposed to immigration to ameliorate working, tax revenue and budget stress, while many retired and elderly voters have short term horizons or simply vote for their own future security.

However, as this issue continues to become significant, especially Japan, there is little political will to deal with it openly and honestly, hence, working age and younger generations will need to deal with it, while having low expectations of state social security support.  

Meanwhile in Australia, there has been two decades of nativist ‘dog whistling’ (undefined) immigration and population growth, via legacy and independent media to persuade voters, yet media and policy makers seem not to understand the demographics, immigration, population and economic effects?

While there is below replacement fertility, fewer youth, working age has passed the ‘demographic sweet spot’, more retirees and increasing old age dependency ratios, that should settle by mid century; in the meantime temporary net migration inc. international students, maintain the working age cohort, pay taxes and for services, while supporting budget health.

‘The problematic politics of Japan’s ageing electorate’

27 February 2023

Author: Yasuo Takao, Curtin University

Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida used a policy speech at the opening of the 2023 session of Japan’s parliament, the National Diet, to declare that Japan was ‘on the brink of not being able to maintain social functions’ due to the country’s population crisis. The country’s median age is 49 — the second highest in the world.

In the 2021 House of Representatives election, the median age of those who cast a vote was 59. The centre of gravity of Japanese electoral politics has shifted from taxpayers to pensioners, with the potential of the elderly exerting more political pressure over policymakers as the population ages.

The majoritarian decision-making model suggests that self-interested aging voters are likely to support increasingly generous social benefits for themselves, even at the expense of other generations.

In Japan, voter turnout has consistently been higher and is steadily increasing among older people. The age gap in Japan’s voter turnout is exceptionally high, with an OECD study finding a gap of 25 percentage points in voter turnout between voters 55 and older and voters under 35, compared with the OECD average of 12 points. Assuming that high turnout is a reflection of political interest, this implies that elderly voters influence politics in a self-interested way, to the detriment of younger generations.

But no studies have yet found clear evidence of such self-interest among Japan’s elderly voters. In the early 2000s, the Japanese public became seriously concerned about the country’s apparently unsustainable level of social security expenditure. The elderly, more than any other cohort of the population, consider social security issues to be important factors in casting their votes.

Japan’s older people may not be as explicitly self-interested as the median voter model would predict. A series of surveys conducted by Japan’s Cabinet Office and Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare found that elderly respondents supported policy constraints on social security just as much as other age cohorts.

Internationally, the Japanese elderly are seen as more accepting of intergenerational equity than the elderly in other countries. Cross-national surveys on those 60 and older, conducted by the Cabinet Office in 2005, 2010, 2015 and 2020, asked whether government policy should prioritise younger people over older people or vice versa. Japan had the highest percentage — 31 per cent — of respondents agreeing that ‘young people should be prioritised’ —compared to 14 per cent in the United States and 17 per cent in both Germany and Sweden.

On this evidence, self-interested voters seeking to maximise their own benefits seems less applicable in the case of the Japanese welfare state. But other factors might also be at play..

The primary factor influencing public attitudes toward social security is demographic changes. In the early 2000s, the urgent need for social security reform in response to Japan’s population crisis captured public attention. The debate that followed played a significant role in influencing the attitudes of the elderly toward social security benefits.

There is undoubtedly a distinctive generational difference in political attitudes. The dankai baby boomer cohort born between 1947 and 1949 experienced turbulent events in their youth — Japan’s rapid economic growth, anti-establishment student movements, industrial pollution and the Vietnam War among them. These dankai-specific experiences bred life-long progressive political attitudes and a propensity to embrace the common good rather than sectional interests. In the 2009 general election a plurality of 49 per cent of voters aged 60–69 voted for the Democratic Party of Japan, which toppled the conservative Liberal Democratic Party.

Japan’s elderly cohort also has the highest labour-force participation among the OECD countries. Nearly half of Japanese men aged 60–70 and one quarter of those aged 70–75 are still in the workforce. About three-quarters of the Japanese elderly workforce work in non-regular positions and consider social security issues important to their votes.

Despite having less secure employment, elderly voters do not necessarily influence politics in a self-interested way to the detriment of younger generations. Employed elderly people continue to find security in belonging to a particular company, which dissuades them from organising around their own interests with others beyond their company ties. Employed elderly people are more likely to identify with the interests of their younger co-workers.

Japan’s public, mandatory long-term care insurance has had a significant impact on the elderly. The dramatic rise of the costs of its operation has undermined its fiscal stability and this universal system weakens the interest in political activism by the elderly. Eligibility is not based on income or family situation but purely on age and physical and mental health.

Anyone 65 or older, plus those aged 40–64 with aging-related diseases, are eligible for institutional or community-based care.

Self-employed individuals, of whom 40 per cent are 65 or older and have no mandatory retirement age, hold opinions aligned with the protection of their small businesses, often against the interests of elderly consumption.

The aging of the Japanese electorate may not have led to politically charged generosity for the elderly at the expense of younger generations, but there are still many puzzles to unravel about how the elderly in Japan are affecting policy choices and political outcomes.

Yasuo Takao is Adjunct Senior Research Fellow at the School of Media, Culture and Creative Arts, Curtin University, Perth.

‘Maintaining Australia’s status as an immigration nation’

20 May 2023

Authors: Stephen Clibborn and Chris F Wright, University of Sydney

Australia has been widely regarded internationally as an exemplary ‘nation of immigrants’, with migration policies that effectively serve the national interest. But since the mid-1990s, Australia’s migration system has shifted away from the long-term provision of skills for nation-building towards a guest worker model aimed at satisfying the short-term demands of business.

The current migration system inefficiently supplies skills, exposes temporary migrants to underpayment and mistreatment and poorly serves the national interest. It has disintegrated to a point where the recent Parkinson Review of the Migration System and Home Affairs Minister Clare O’Neil declared it ‘broken’ and in need of an overhaul.

The Parkinson Review identified three general principles to return to a sound migration system: tripartite involvement of unions and employer associations with government in designing and implementing policy, universality of regulation for migrants and mobility for migrants to transfer between employers. The government announced it will now undertake a major reform of the migration system using input from the Parkinson Review.

The government’s single concrete immediate policy announcement in response to the review was increasing the Temporary Skilled Migration Income Threshold (TSMIT), which was justified on grounds that it would help reduce exploitation of workers. This policy increases the effective minimum pay rate for some classes of migrant workers from AU$53,900, where it has languished since 2013, to AU$70,000. That means employers sponsoring temporary migrant workers under the Temporary Skill Shortage scheme from 1 July 2023 must pay a minimum annual salary of AU$70,000. This is a compromise between recommendations from business groups — AU$63,000 — and the Australian Council of Trade Unions — AU$90,000.

The government has stated that simplifying the migration system, delivering skills needed by business and reducing exploitation of migrant workers are its main priorities. Many of the Parkinson Review’s recommendations will help achieve these goals. Recommendations such as removing restrictions on temporary skilled migrants’ mobility between employers and independent assessment of skills demand are helpful. But other recommendations potentially undermine them, such as continued reliance on the TSMIT and creating three tiers of temporary labour migration. This may further complicate the system, reduce labour supply and maintain exploitation.

Historical and comparative research suggests that the government’s goals can be best achieved by strengthening ties between migration and employment regulations. Many problems with the migration system can be traced back to the expansion of temporary visas in 1996. Prior to this, the migration system was relatively simple. It supplied skills to business efficiently and migrant worker exploitation was lower. Complementary migration and employment regulations contributed to these outcomes.

Three changes would better align migration and employment regulations.

First, abandon the TSMIT pay threshold. Minister O’Neil’s headline policy announcement — raising the TSMIT — places excessive faith in salary level as a measure of skill and worker power. The Parkinson Review’s recommendation to build a three-tier system of employment regulation around salary levels does likewise on the basis that those workers paid above the TSMIT are likely to be at limited risk of exploitation. The policy focus should not be on the level of the threshold but its very existence.

For many years, Australia’s Minister for Home Affairs has had the power to set the TSMIT, resulting in pay rates being determined by political considerations rather than labour market assessments. This contrasts with the methodical and transparent way the Fair Work Commission’s Expert Panels set minimum wages.

Maintaining the TSMIT risks reinforcing separate labour markets for migrants and citizens, undermining the government’s objectives. An increased TSMIT could also price out some skilled jobs in sectors with pronounced labour demand, such as health, social care and hospitality. This would likely generate political pressure for new job-specific visas to address Australia’s skill needs, further complicating the migration system.

Second, independently assess skills needs. The Parkinson Review recommended using Jobs and Skills Australia, a new Commonwealth agency, to better align migration and labour market regulations. This agency will help to ensure migration better complements the education and training system. For decades these policy areas have been at cross-purposes, despite their mutual objectives of supplying necessary skills.

Using Jobs and Skills Australia to strengthen coordination between migration, on one hand, and education and training, on the other, will help ensure skills and workforce needs are assessed and addressed more reliably. This approach will give employers more confidence to invest in developing their workforces.

Third, enforce employment regulations more effectively. Without this, unscrupulous employers will continue to underpay and mistreat vulnerable temporary migrants, gaining a competitive advantage over honest operators. Without effective enforcement, businesses are discouraged from seeking to succeed through quality, innovation and productivity improvements, which are essential for Australia’s international competitiveness. The assumption that a certain level of pay in the TSMIT and a proposed higher-paid visa tier equates to individual worker power to resist underpayment is misplaced.

In implementing the Parkinson Review’s recommendations, the government must ensure migration regulations are better integrated with wider employment regulations. This will help achieve the government’s triple goals of simplifying the system, supplying skills more effectively and reducing worker exploitation. This will ensure the migration system continues to support Australia’s international standing as a successful ‘nation of immigrants’.

Stephen Clibborn is an Associate Professor and Co-Director of the Sydney Employment Relations Research Group at the University of Sydney Business School, University of Sydney.

Chris F Wright is an Associate Professor and Co-Director of the Sydney Employment Relations Research Group at the University of Sydney Business School, University of Sydney.

For related links and article on Ageing Democracy, Australian Immigration News, Demography, Government Budgets, Pensions, Taxation and Younger Generations click through:

Population Pyramids, Economics, Ageing, Pensions, Demography and Misunderstanding Data Sets

Australian Migration Review 2023 – For Immigrants and Nation or a Nativist Trap?

Global Population Decline and Impacts

Population Decline in Asia is Near with Africa to Follow

Population Decline and Effects on Taxation, Benefits, Economy and Society

Grey Tsunami – Electoral Demographics – Ageing Populations vs. Youth

Ageing Democracy, Nativism and Populism

Developing Better Asian Capability Education in Australia

Australian article from the Conversation on ‘Supporting our Schools to Develop Asia Capable Kids’ to develop Asian capabilities not just on China, but neighbours in the Asian century. 

It’s the opposite of UK PM Sunak’s policy idea of mathematics till the end of secondary school, due to issues with maths literacy in society, amongst adults, who also need education.

However, on Asian capability, school is important along with general society, especially our influential middle aged elites in media, politics and the corporate world of ‘skip’ or Anglo-Irish heritage of the past decade, many seem to have shared antipathy towards the region?

An example is how many Australians have been to Bali, but neither understand that it’s part of Indonesia, nor the significance of the Indonesian economy now and in future i.e. it is expected to become the 7th largest economy in the world by 2030.

For Australia’s influential elite cohorts, many seem more interested in the ‘Anglosphere’ of UK and USA, than Australia’s role in our region?

‘SUPPORTING OUR SCHOOLS TO DEVELOP ASIA CAPABLE KIDS

Asia capable initiatives that only target adults and young adults leaves it far too late – it has to start in our schools

By Chris Higgins, University of Melbourne

As the world becomes progressively more connected and interconnected, it’s increasingly important for all people to develop the skills and knowledge necessary to engage with different cultures and countries.

This is particularly important for our young people who are growing into an increasingly complex and dynamic world.

More than ever, they need to possess the capabilities to navigate a fast-changing and diverse world and work together to overcome complex global challenges.

For Australia, the world’s largest island, physically located in the Asia-Pacific region, this is of paramount importance.

Our Indigenous peoples have more than 60,000 years continuous connection, histories and culture, and have been trading with international partners for many thousands of years.

These deep economic, social and cultural ties to other countries continue today.

We are one of the most multicultural countries in the world, with a diverse population made up of people from over 200 different countries with a long history of immigration, shaped by successive waves of migrants from different parts of the world.

Today, almost a third of Australia’s population was born overseas, and more than 400 different languages – including 167 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander languages – are spoken in Australian homes.

Our diversity is reflected in our cities, towns, communities and homes, where people from diverse cultural backgrounds live side-by-side, sharing traditions, customs, languages and experiences.

The Australian government has long recognised our multiculturalism, the benefits of social cohesion, respect for cultural diversity and our place in the Asia-Pacific region.

In 2012, the Australian Government released the Australia in the Asian Century White Paper, which outlined a vision for Australia to deepen its engagement with the Asian region and the advantages of the region’s growth and rising influence.

The White Paper called for a comprehensive approach to developing Asia capability across all sectors of Australian society, including government, business, education and the community.

It also highlighted the need to increase language skills and cultural awareness as well as knowledge of Asian markets and regulatory frameworks across the ‘whole-of-nation’.

Since the release of the White Paper, the Australian Government continued to support development of Asia capability in many areas including initiatives like the New Colombo Plan, which provides funding for Australian university students to study and undertake internships in the Asia-Pacific region.

But, all too often, initiatives like this focus on economic priorities and adults in tertiary education or the existing workforce.

Rarely do they support our young people who will become our adult learners and workforce of the future.

Despite recent references from the Australian government to strengthen ‘whole-of-nation’ Asia capability there has been almost no support for Asia capability in Australian schools since 2012.

Asia capable initiatives that only target adults and young adults leaves it far too late. There needs to be support for our young people to develop Asia capability.

Australian schools and classrooms reflect the very multicultural and diverse nature of our nation. Our students and teachers represent a broad diversity of cultures, languages, experiences and perspectives – which are becoming more diverse each year.

Students need the support to develop these essential skills.

Often economic explanations are cited as the main arguments for developing Asia capability

The Asia-Pacific region is one of the fastest-growing and most dynamic regions in the world, with significant economic, political and cultural influence.

Young people who develop Asia capability will be well-placed to take advantage of the opportunities to collaborate and prosper from shared regional growth and influence.

Another well-worn reason is that Asia capability is essential for promoting national security and diplomatic relations.

As Australia’s relationships in the region deepen, it’s important for our students to develop an understanding of the strategic and geopolitical dynamics of the region, as well as the cultural and linguistic skills necessary to engage with people and organisations.

However, these explanations miss the far more relevant and immediate benefits. Asia capability promotes cultural understanding and social cohesion. By developing an understanding of different cultures and languages, our young people can develop empathy and respect for different ways of life – building bridges between different communities and promoting social harmony.

It’s essential our students and teachers are supported to have the knowledge, understanding, skills and attitudes to create cohesive, inclusive, diverse schools. In turn, they will become adults who have the capabilities to support cohesive communities, societies, nation and a shared, prosperous Asia-Pacific.

The means to deliver this already exist.

The Australian Curriculum recognises our diversity and includes several Cross-Curriculum Priorities and General Capabilities all educators and schools are expected to support for students.

The Cross-Curriculum Priority of Asia and Australia’s Engagement with Asia and the General Capability of Intercultural Understanding that all teachers are expected to support, regardless of subject areas taught, are crucial components of the Australian Curriculum.

But they are often perceived as add-ons, the responsibility of other discipline areas like languages. Many teachers don’t have the resources or time to embed them in their classrooms or don’t feel they have strong Asia capability.

Investing in supporting our Asia capability, by making teaching knowledge and resources available to the entire Australian school education workforce is crucial to achieving the intention of the Australian Curriculum and the Australian government’s priority of whole-of-nation Asia capability and strengthened ties with the region.

The Asia Education Foundation has released a Pre-Budget Submission to the Australian Government calling on the Commonwealth to support Asia capability in all schools.’

For more related articles and blogs on Adult Learning, Asian Century, Cross Cultural Communication, Media, Pedagogy, Soft Skills, Teaching in Australia and Younger Generations click through

Australia: Return to the Future of an Asian Century vs. the Anglosphere Colonial Past

Australia Return to the Anglosphere – Ignoring the Australian Eurasian Society and the Asian Century

Asian Century Starts 2020?

History of Globalisation and 21st Century

China PRC – Fertility Decline – Peak Population?

Media on China and Wuhan Virus – Critical Analysis or Political PR?

Population Decline in Asia is Near with Africa to Follow

Recently Nikkei Asia, drawing on research from the University of Washington, published an article contrary to much of the western Anglo or European world’s view of population and humanity, i.e. start of long term population decline has arrived, not infinite increases.

While they present and analyse well, albeit dependent upon sub-optimal UNPD data, they acknowledge the lowering fertility rates from which headline population data is derived.

Since the time of Malthus then fossil fuel supported ZPG Zero Population Growth it has been assumed that high fertility and higher populations were inevitable. However, ZPG relied on high UNPD fertility rates and data, with catastrophic or pessimistic predictions that are now looking less likely.

More recently several demographers and researchers have successfully analysed and argued to show that fertility has peaked, population is to follow by mid century or earlier, as opposed to UNPD forecasts based on unclear or unexplained fertility rate changes in China and India, i.e. declining then rising again to peak at double figures.

The new population bomb –  For the first time, humanity is on the verge of long-term decline

KAZUO YANASE, YOHEI MATSUO, EUGENE LANG and ERI SUGIURA, Nikkei staff writers

SEPTEMBER 22, 2021 06:06 JST

TOKYO — For the past 200 years, a rapidly rising population has consumed the earth’s resources, ruined the environment, and started wars. But humanity is about to trade one population bomb for another, and now scientists and policymakers are waking up to a new reality: The world is on the precipice of decline, and possible extinction.

The twin forces of economic development and women’s empowerment are combining to end the age brought on by the Industrial Revolution, in which economic growth was buoyed by a growing population, and vice versa. Since the early 19th century, the rising tide of humanity has provoked many dire predictions: English economist Thomas Malthus argued as early as 1798 that population would grow so fast it would outstrip food production and lead to famine. In 1972, the Club of Rome warned that humanity would reach the “limits to growth” within 100 years, driven by a relentless rise in the global population and environmental pollution.

Today the world’s population, which stood as 1 billion in 1800, is now 7.8 billion, and the strain on the planet is clear. But scientists and policymakers are slowly waking up to the new numbers: The population growth rate reached a peak of 2.09% in the late 1960s, but it will fall below 1% in 2023, according to a study by the University of Washington, published last year. 

In 2017, the growth rate of people aged 15 to 64 — the working-age population — fell below 1%. The working-age population has already begun to drop in about a quarter of countries around the world. By 2050, 151 of the world’s 195 countries and regions will experience depopulation.

Ultimately, the study forecasts that the global population will peak at 9.7 billion in 2064 and then start declining.

Over the approximately 300,000 years of human history, cold-weather periods and epidemics have caused temporary drops in population. But now humanity will enter a period of sustained decline for the first time ever, according to Hiroshi Kito, a historical demographer and former president of the University of Shizuoka.

East Asia is one region that already faces the world’s most acute baby bust — led by South Korea’s total fertility rate of 1.11, Taiwan’s 1.15 and Japan’s 1.37 average from 2015 to 2020, according to the United Nations publication “World Population Prospects 2019.” A country’s population begins to drop when fertility falls below the so-called replacement rate of 2.1. This has led to labor shortages, pension fund crises and the obsolescence of old economic models.

Southeast Asia, which has powered global growth as a part of the “Asian Miracle,” is also at a critical juncture. Thailand once had a total fertility rate of more than 6, but it is now 1.53, coming closer to Japan. In 2019, the working-age population began to decline, and the economic growth rate was around 2.4%. That is roughly one-third the 7.5% economic growth the country experienced in the 1970s.

Vietnam, meanwhile, became an aging society in 2017. In January the government began raising the retirement age for men and women [now 60 and 55, respectively], in an effort to head off a pension crisis. It will reach 62 for men by 2028 and 60 for women by 2035.

But the biggest force behind the “degrowth” trend is China. The University of Washington predicts that its population will begin to drop from next year, and that by 2100 it will plummet to 730 million from the current 1.41 billion. By that same year, 23 countries, including Japan, will see their populations shrink to half their current levels or less, according to Christopher Murray, head of the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation at the University of Washington, who has focused much of his career on improving global health.

The University of Washington study comes as a corrective to previous estimates that saw the global population continuing to grow through this century. “World Population Prospects” in 2019 estimated that the population is likely to continue to grow, reaching 10.9 billion by 2100. But new projections show the birthrate in developing countries falling faster than expected.

Murray believes global fertility will converge at around 1.5, and likely lower in some countries. “This also means that humanity will eventually disappear in the next hundreds of years,” he said.

The new reality will create new dynamics — already visible in some cases — in areas from monetary policy to pension systems to real estate prices, to the structure of capitalism as a whole. As global population approaches its peak, many governments are increasingly under pressure to rethink their policies, which have so far relied mostly on demographic expansion for their economic growth and geopolitical power.

Getting old before getting rich

Asia’s baby boomers are reaching retirement age, and the population as a whole is growing older, and governments have experienced a rapid increase in social security spending, including for pensions and medical care.

With an over-65 population of more than 21% and a per capita gross domestic product of above $44,000, Japan has become a “super-aged society.” When the working-age population and companies can no longer support the social security system, government funding becomes the only option.

In China, the number of births skyrocketed after the Great Chinese Famine of 1959 to 1961, and the total population increased by about 190 million in the following decade. China’s baby boom generation, which is 1.5 times the size of Japan’s total population, will begin to reach the retirement age of 60 next year. The burden of this mass retirement will fall on a society of the “unwealthy elderly,” who will grow old before they become wealthy.

China faces the prospect of growing old before it becomes wealthy enough to pay for the pensions of the coming wave of elderly retirees. 

“It’s a hard life,” said Chen, 59, who lives in a farming village in China’s eastern Jiangsu Province. He works as a plasterer, building brick houses. Chen suffers from a chronic illness, but with no pension he does not plan on retiring when he turns 60 this year. He stayed in the village instead of moving to a city so he could take care of his parents.

China’s transition to a market economy since the 1980s sent migrant workers streaming to cities. Families in rural areas are increasingly unable to support their elderly relatives. Just over 70% of the population has joined the pension system that was set up in 2009. Its benefits are about 10% the average income of the working-age population. An insurance system for elderly care, like that of Japan, is still in the trial stage…..

For more blogs and articles about immigration and population growth click through below.

Expert Analysis of Australia’s Populist Immigration and Population Growth Obsessions

Demography, Immigration, Population and the Greening of Hate

Population Pyramids, Economics, Ageing, Pensions, Demography and Misunderstanding Data Sets

China PRC – Fertility Decline – Peak Population?

Malthus on Population Growth, Economy, Environment, White Nationalism and Eugenics

Grey Tsunami – Electoral Demographics – Ageing Populations vs. Youth

Population Growth or Decline?

UNPD Global Population Growth Forecasts Debunked

China PRC – Fertility Decline – Peak Population?

Many people believe through constant media attention and promotion, that the world is heading for ever higher population growth, based upon supposedly high fertility rates, and migration.  However, as Bricker & Ibbitson found in their population research for ‘Empty Planet’ a few years ago, that not only are fertility rates declining, but much faster than forecast, hence, will impact population growth, economy and society.  However, this dynamic is not being reflected by the UNPD in their analysis with e.g. fertility rates declining in China and India, then lifting off again to reach a rate of 2 later in this century. 

Following are related excerpts from an article by Andy Cie in the South China Morning Post explaining the impact of declining fertility rates and population in China:

Population decline could end China’s civilisation as we know it. When will Beijing wake up to the crisis? Andy Xie 3 Mar 2021

• The seeds of the crisis were sown by a development strategy that relied on cheap, plentiful migrant workers to power manufacturing and construction
• Now, their children don’t want to be like them – they would rather surf the internet than have children. The property bubble is only making things worse

The Chinese government recently reported a sharp drop in registered newborns in 2020, 15 per cent down on the year before. This follows three consecutive yearly declines. Instead of a pandemic baby boom, China seems to be having a baby crisis, worse than in far richer countries such as Japan and South Korea. Does it matter?

The total number of births in China for 2020 is likely to be significantly below 14 million, compared to the annual average of 16.3 million over the past two decades. At the rate China is going, average annual births for the current decade may fall below 12 million, which would be roughly half the number for the 1980s and the 1990s.

While fast-greying Japan is widely known to face the greatest demographic challenges, it has suffered a less dramatic drop in average births over the past four decades than China.

China’s low birth rate last year had little to do with the coronavirus crisis, as lockdowns became nationwide only around February. Instead, it is more significant that marriages had declined in previous years, even falling below the 10 million mark for the first time in 2019. Given the trend, the baby crisis is unlikely to ease this year. Indeed, China’s marriage statistics look a lot like Japan’s, but with a decade’s delay….

….Around the region, rising living costs seem to be a major driver of demographic change. Japan’s fertility rate took a big dip in the 1980s as property prices surged. Similar trends have been observed in other East Asian economies, including Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan. As housing is the most important cost in family formation, it shouldn’t be controversial to suggest that a property bubble weighs on the birth rate……

….Economics can trigger demographic change. But the ensuing cultural shift might make it difficult to reverse the change, even when economic conditions improve. In Japan, the normalisation of the single lifestyle has become a major barrier to the reversal of the falling birth rate, even though living costs have become more reasonable in the past two decades.

The same thing could happen to China. By the time the population decline deflates the property bubble in the coming decade, cheaper housing may no longer be enough for people to marry and have children…..

….When half the people are old, the economy will struggle to take care of the whole population. And it may further dampen the desire to have children, as people realise that their children would be growing up to keep old people fed. The vicious circle could lead to a national calamity: it could spell the end of Chinese civilisation as we know it.

It might take five or even 10 years for the Chinese government to wake up to the seriousness of the demographic crisis. After all, there are always more immediate and urgent concerns at hand. By the time the government wants to do something about the crisis, it could be too late. No country in East Asia has been able to reverse the trend. Could the Chinese government beat the odds?

For more related blogs and articles click through Asian Century, Demography, Economics, Government Budgets, Immigration, Pensions, Population Growth, Statistical Analysis and Younger Generations.

UNPD Global Population Growth Forecasts Debunked

For generations and especially the past decades the Anglo world along with UN Population Division, ZPG Zero Population Growth, Club of Rome, FAIR/CIS, Population Matters UK and Sustainable Population Australia, have highlighted and stressed population growth as the issue of the times, even to the point of describing it as ‘exponential’.  However, the movement has too many links with the eugenics movement or white nationalism and misrepresents research and data e.g. claiming overly high fertility rates, focusing upon now and ignoring future (lower) forecasts based on good analysis.

 

The following articles touch on how The Lancet has debunked the UN Population Division’s alarmism on fertility rates and global population, then followed with Abul Rizvi comparing the impacts of population, low fertility and immigration on Australia, with Japan.

 

‘World population growth set to fall by 2100, as new dominant powers emerge

 

• An international study in The Lancet predicted a world population of 8.8 billion by the end of the century as fertility rates decline
• China’s population is expected to fall to 780 million. Geopolitical power will shift to China, India, Nigeria and the United States

 

Earth will be home to 8.8 billion souls in 2100, 2 billion fewer than current UN projections, according to a major study published on Wednesday that foresees new global power alignments shaped by declining fertility rates and greying populations.

 

By century’s end, 183 of 195 countries – barring an influx of immigrants – will have fallen below the replacement threshold needed to maintain population levels, an international team of researchers reported in The Lancet.

 

More than 20 countries – including Japan, Spain, Italy, Thailand, Portugal, South Korea and Poland – will see their numbers diminish by at least half.

 

China’s will fall nearly that much, from 1.4 billion people today to 730 million in 80 years.

 

Sub-Saharan Africa, meanwhile, will triple in size to some 3 billion people, with Nigeria alone expanding to almost 800 million in 2100, second only to India’s 1.1 billion.

 

“These forecasts suggest good news for the environment, with less stress on food production systems and lower carbon emissions, as well as significant economic opportunity for parts of Sub-Saharan Africa,” said lead author Christopher Murray, director of the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME) at the University of Washington.

 

“However, most countries outside of Africa will see shrinking workforces and inverting population pyramids, which will have profound negative consequences for the economy.”

 

‘Population ageing in Australia and Japan

 

Abul Rizvi 19 June 2020

 

Australia and Japan are demographic polar opposites.

 

While Australia boosted immigration to slow its rate of ageing from around the Year 2000, Japan maintained very low levels of immigration. Combined with lower fertility, low immigration has led to Japan ageing quickly. Its working age to population (WAP) ratio has fallen almost 10 percentage points since this peaked around 1990. Australia’s WAP ratio over the same period declined only marginally (see Chart 1).

 

Japan’s working age population fell by 10.5 million between 1990 and 2018 while Australia’s working age population increased 4.9 million.

 

The last available estimate of the portion of foreign born in Japan was 1.02% in 2001, one of the lowest in the developed world. That compared to Australia at 23.0% in 2001 and 29.6% in 2019, one of the highest in the developed world.

 

The median age in Japan in 2017 had increased to 46.7, one of the highest in the developed world, compared to Australia’s 37.5, one of the lowest in the developed world.

 

In 1990, the 65+ population in Japan was 12.1% while Australia’s was 11.1%, a difference of 2%. By 2018, Japan’s 65+ population had increased to 28.1% while Australia’s was 15.7%, a staggering difference of 12.4%.

 

While there are many factors impacting different economies, the extent of demographic difference between Japan and Australia will tend to highlight any differential impact from population ageing.

 

Japan entered its demographic burden phase (ie WAP ratio in decline) almost two decades earlier than Australia which entered its demographic burden phase from 2009. All things equal, Australia’s economy should have performed more strongly than Japan’s from 1990 onwards. As Australia has aged much less since 2009, it should have maintained that advantage, including in per capita terms….

 

……The pressure for Japan to get its immigration settings right will continue to grow as its rate of ageing again accelerates after 2030 and its rate of population decline continues accelerating.

 

While Australia moved early to use immigration to slow the rate of ageing, Japan is moving very late – perhaps too late to prevent a rapid decline in living standards associated with resumption of rapid ageing and decline.

 

But Australia will also now age rapidly over the next 10-20 years with the likelihood of further decline in its fertility rate as well as lower net overseas migration under current policy settings after international borders are opened. This is projected at almost 100,000 per annum less than forecast in the 2019 Budget.’

 

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