Australian Migration Review 2023 – For Immigrants and Nation or a Nativist Trap?

The Australian Migration Review Report has been published, based on narratives and submissions, but little meaningful grass roots feedback or data to support any grounded analysis for good future reforms?

This post will focus on NOM Net Overseas Migration and major source or factor i.e. international education and students, but for now, not the other main factors including WHV Working Holiday Visas (2nd year) and temporary workers.

There are generic review report issues e.g. lack of direct support for many narratives and recommendations, does not explain budget issues of ageing i.e. more low or no tax payers in retirement as baby boomer bubble transitions vs. decline in working age cohort of PAYE taxpayers, to support more Australian retirees.

Further, barely references ‘black swan’ event Covid and the effect it had on Australia including closed borders, preceded by under-resourced and slow processing of most visa types onshore and then via the NOM education, tourism, travel etc. simply caught up?

The focus of this post is the potential reform of limiting or capping the NOM Net Overseas Migration which shows a suboptimal understanding i.e. it’s a ‘barometer’ not a visa or migration program that can controlled by any specific or exact measure, but only by capping education enrolments or Working Holiday Visas?

This would be a repeat of the Gillard government’s response to ‘wedges’ by media and right wing NGOs’ dog whistling of the NOM (quietly expanded in 2006 by the UNPD) spike, ‘Big Australia’, supposed environmental hygiene issues of modern ‘immigrants’, appointing a Minister for Sustainable Australia and giving higher education (higher value) advantage over the VET Vocational sector; but worse in the UK.

The UK also uses the same ‘nebulous’ UNPD defined NOM formula to quantify border movements, but also misrepresented as ‘immigration’, followed by media headlines and dog whistling in late ‘90s, ‘wedging’ UK Conservative PM Cameron into action on reducing ‘immigration’, from The Guardian (11 January 2010):

‘Tories would limit immigration to ‘tens of thousands’ a year, says Cameron. Conservative leader says net immigration of 200,000 people a year is ‘too much’…..”We would like to see net immigration in the tens of thousands rather than the hundreds of thousands,” he told BBC1’s Andrew Marr Show.’

Cameron complained of the media ‘banging on about (EU) immigration’ then pledged to reduce the NOM dramatically, hence, immigration, but the numbers then rose and was compelled to call the European Referendum, that led to Brexit over immigration and identity, again by the media and far right; negative Brexit outcomes, not dividends, are still occurring with working age decline.

Summary through excerpts of the introduction and later focus upon NOM Net Overseas Migration:

‘REVIEW OF THE MIGRATION SYSTEM – FINAL REPORT 2023

The Reviewers

Dr Martin Parkinson AC PSM, Chair

Professor Joanna Howe

Mr John Azarias

Reviewers and the Department of Home Affairs Migration Reform Taskforce (containing 

secondees from the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Treasury, Foreign Affairs and Trade, and Jobs and Skills Australia, and Boston Consulting Group).

(inc. indirectly Prof. Peter McDonald, demographer at University of Melbourne who also made a one page submission that a media outlet, like most, misrepresented immigration and population data due to a lack of data literacy, but this has been occurring for decades?)

We identified five objectives, discussed in further detail in this report, on which to 

build the program:

1. Building Australia’s prosperity by lifting productivity, meeting labour 

supply needs and by supporting exports

2. Enabling a fair labour market, including by complementing the jobs, wages 

and conditions of domestic workers

3. Building a community of Australians

4. Protecting Australia’s interests in the world.

5. Providing a fast, efficient and fair system.

The unique complexities of migration and the gaps in our understanding of the 

effects of our migration system – on migrants and Australia – highlight the critical 

need for better data, more program evaluation and research to inform better 

program design. We can’t stay on track if we don’t know how we are going, nor can 

we drive improvement or share data with stakeholders who are trying to make a 

difference too.

Australia is not focused enough on capturing high potential international students. This chapter considers the success of the Student visa in supporting the export of Australian education, but also the missed opportunity to better support and select the best and brightest students as skilled migrants’ (motherhood statement?). 

Reform directions for Government to consider

Through the course of the Panel’s deliberations, we arrived at a set of reform 

directions that could be considered by Government as it decides on its approach to 

the migration system. These are set out below, and described in greater detail 

throughout the report.

Possible reform directions:

Redefine how  Australia determines the size and composition of the migration program

6. Plan migration based on net overseas migration (which accounts for both permanent and temporary residents), rather than simply relying on permanent migration caps (p. 8).

5. AUSTRALIA NEEDS LONG-TERM AND HOLISTIC MIGRATION PLANNING (p. 41)

Today, Australia mainly relies on the annual permanent migration cap to manage migrant numbers. This is a poor tool for driving predictability of overall migration flows. Government needs to consider the optimal size and composition of migrant intakes (temporary and permanent) over the medium to long term in the best interests of Australia.’

‘If the supply of infrastructure and housing does not keep up with demand created by migration, the quality of infrastructure and housing services may deteriorate, and prices may rise. As a result, material and non-material living standards of the local population and newly arrived migrants may be undermined (unsupported by any research evidence?)

Without appropriate policy responses, large and unanticipated increases in labour supply, or sharp falls in demand, can lead in the short run to both falling real wages and higher unemployment.

Social cohesion can also be undermined if the pace of migration is greater than the time it takes for migrants to settle, integrate and become part of the community. Costs imposed on local communities (housing, labour market impacts) can also reduce cohesion and have an impact on migrant integration and prosperity.’ (unsupported by any research evidence?)

There is no evidence provided, and apart from the media encouraging dog whistling to reinforce negative perceptions and attitudes, there isn’t any? In fact opposite, from Foster’s surveys in ‘Immigration and the Australian economy’ (2012):

‘William Foster’s surveys over 200 studies on immigration and wages. He found there was, “a marginally favourable effect on the aggregate unemployment rate, even in recession”.’

‘Migration planning needs to remain flexible to changing economic 

Environments (pp. 47-9):

‘During periods of high NOM, like 2006–09 and 2016–19 (Figure 15), there were 

increased concerns about congestion in cities, as infrastructure and other support 

did not keep pace with population growth in some areas. This led to falling support 

for the migration program (not supported by research evidence?).

This experience helps provide guidance for a recommended NOM level* relative to 

population growth, given the current levels of investment.’

Since when can the NOM be micromanaged, simply evidence of suboptimal understanding of the NOM and the multiple factors it’s derived from, acting as ‘barometer’? Neither Figures 14 or 15 etc. highlight a significant demographic event related to the NOM, i.e. UNPD’s expansion in 2006, which spiked the NOM, hence, estimated resident population. 

‘Reform directions

The Panel suggests Government consider moving beyond reliance on the permanent migration cap as the only tool for managing migration flows. Specifically, there might be value in developing ways of better managing temporary migration, alongside permanent migration. This likely means government would be attempting to manage NOM – which is the truer measure of migration’s impact on population growth, communities and the economy.’ 

On international education – indirect contribution from peak bodies or stakeholders via submissions, yet international education is the largest source of NOM captures or border movements 12/16+ months, but ignored the expansion and inflation in 2006?

Also largely ignored the impact of Covid and slow onshore visa processing by the previous LNP government, like the UK may have been to discourage those hoping for substantive residency visas.

Warning to the Australian government, be careful what you (are encouraged to) wish for, by trying to control population via the NOM they are falling into a ‘nativist trap’?

For more related post and blog on Ageing Democracy, Australian Politics, Demography, NOM Net Overseas Migration, Population Growth, Populist Politics and White Nationalism  click through:

Economic Research – No Negative Relationship with Immigration and Wages, Income or Employment

Population Pyramids, Economics, Ageing, Pensions, Demography and Misunderstanding Data Sets

Population Decline and Effects on Taxation, Benefits, Economy and Society

Malthus on Population Growth, Economy, Environment, White Nationalism and Eugenics

Immigration Population Growth Decline NOM Net Overseas Migration

NOM Net Overseas Migration – Immigration – Population Growth

EU & Anglosphere – Refugees – Border Walls vs. Working Age Decline

EU & Anglosphere – Refugees – Border Walls vs. Working Age Decline

While media, governments, think tanks, NGOs and politicians highlight, stress about, gaslight and promote negative tactics to stop refugees e.g. British government’s policies on channel crossings and using Rwanda as an offshore detention centre, there are gaps growing in the working age cohort due to demographic decline.

Not only is much of agitprop this drawn from old ideology by right wing or nativist politicians, while holding libertarian views on much else, a clear need for temporary and/or permanent immigration to plug employment gaps, pay taxes and support budgets for more retirees and pensioners using social services, is apparent.

Good examples are Britain and other OECD nations which share below replacement fertility, fewer youth and demographic decline in working age i.e. has passed the ‘demographic sweet spot’, but more retirees and ever increasing old age dependency ratios.

In short, we need well and better supported budgets for more retirees needing the support but they vote against their own interests e.g. Brexit?

See OECD data here on working age trends.

OECD (2023), Working age population (indicator). doi: 10.1787/d339918b-en (Accessed on 20 March 2023) 

However, nativist politics and talking points, targeting older voters on refugees, immigration, population growth and purported negative issues, then precludes the solutions i.e.  increase net migration, temporary or seasonal workers as ‘net financial budget contributors’ and more modest numbers of permanent migrants, going onto citizenship. 

Following analysis explains immigration and employment issues for the EU, from The EU Observer:

‘On migration, Europe needs to pivot from walls to work

By MICHELE LEVOY   BRUSSELS, 16. FEB, 07:00

It’s not news that Europe wants fewer migrants reaching its borders. What is less visible is that at the same time Europe is scrambling to get more migrants — to fill dramatic labour shortages, with little consideration for workers’ and human rights. The approach so far has been hypocritical, harmful — and self-defeating.

EU migration policies have long been promoting a narrative of migration as a threat, and something that should be tackled with a defensive and punitive approach.

The 2020 EU Migration Pact, still under negotiation, is billed as overhauling the EU migration system, but instead just expands existing measures like detention for anyone coming to Europe via irregular routes, including children, and speeding up deportations, while lowering human rights safeguards.

The never-ending fight against irregular migration

Last week, the European Council asked the Commission to fund border surveillance technology and to step up the use of visa agreements as a tool to pressure other countries into accepting swifter and more deportations of their citizens. Throughout 2022, several agreements were struck to increase joint policing at common borders, including between France and the UK, Germany and Switzerland, and Czechia and Slovakia.

The proposed revision of the Schengen Borders Code would allow border guards to stop and check people crossing borders internally within the EU if they believe that the individuals can’t prove their right to enter the country. There is little doubt that this amounts to legitimising racial profiling.

The demand for workforce

While Europe cracks down on migration, it also discreetly tries to get more migrants to fill ever more dramatic labour shortages in key sectors from hospitality to construction, from transportation to health care.

In practice, this means granting residence permits to people already living in the country through ongoing or new regularisation mechanisms, and creating work permits for people to come to work in the EU from abroad. Yet many of these measures may be driven by the demand for workforce, with little attention for workers’ rights.

France is negotiating a regularisation scheme for shortage occupations — but it’s been criticised for focusing on workers employed in the most physically demanding professions, while leaving out other key sectors and skills.

In January 2023, the right-wing Italian government increased the number of available permits for non-EU workers from 69,700 in 2022 to 82,705 but more than half are for seasonal work, which is often extremely precarious and rife with exploitation.

The 2020 Italian regularisation was largely prompted by fears that the country’s fields would remain without workers due to COVID-19 restrictions on international travel. The regularisation kept workers dependent on their employers, and conditions to apply were extremely strict and burdensome. The result is that only a third of the applicants managed to regularise their stay….’

For more articles about Ageing Democracy, Demography, EU European Union, Immigration, Media, Pensions, Tanton Network and White Nationalism:

Immigration to Australia – More Opportunities for Temporary Residents?

Collective Narcissism, Ageing Electorates, Pensioner Populism, White Nativism and Autocracy

Narcissistic Political Leaders – NPD Narcissistic Personality Disorder – Collective Narcissism – Cognitive Dissonance – Conspiracy Theories – Populism

Ageing Democracy, Nativism and Populism

Economic Research – No Negative Relationship with Immigration and Wages, Income or Employment

Population Pyramids, Economics, Ageing, Pensions, Demography and Misunderstanding Data Sets

Interesting article ‘The end of the population pyramid’  but one would suggest that it’s no longer a ‘population pyramid’ inverted or otherwise, while ‘pro-natal’ or positive eugenics policies and working age population data require more scrutiny, especially when backgrounded by antipathy in Australian (UK and US ) media and politics towards post 1970s ‘immigration’, influencing older monocultural voters (ditto Hungary etc. to avoid ‘immigration’ central to conservative political messaging, even to the point of conspiracy theories like round ‘Soros’).  

For example, constantly conflating increased temporary churn over via the NOM (since 2006) from students etc. with permanent migration yet there is no strong if any correlation, then worse, blaming the same ‘population growth’ for environmental degradation (allowing fossil fuels and regulation off the hook AKA strategy of  ZPG supported by Rockefeller Bros, Ford and Carnegie Foundations in the ’70s, and with the mantle passing to Kochs and similar groups).

The world, especially including more educated and empowered women in the developing world, have already decided to have fewer children reflected in sliding fertility rates to below replacement; not aware of any research showing substantive outcomes from pro-natal policies except bringing plans forward on having children, to be followed by a fertility dip?

Population data cannot be compared easily in a global context due to different definitions, collection methods and presentation, while demographers use multiple types of population data sets to base their e.g. workforce analysis on, related to dependency ratios and pensions.  

For example, in some cases economists are using some dubious methods in arguing the case against offering an increase in the SCG super contribution guarantee by claiming a binary i.e. would preclude any wage rises; also claiming increased sustainability of the state pension by claiming a low(er) dependency ratio by falsely presenting plenty of workers to support a future of pensions only (no need for super).

However, ‘statistics 101’, it appears that the forecasts or projections of the general or ‘estimated resident population’ counting 15-64 year olds of ‘working age’, but not parsing through or filtering out the significant numbers of ‘temporary residents’ caught up in the NOM who have limited and/or no work rights vs. citizens and permanent residents with no restrictions.

If the latter is presented well, then the ‘population pyramid’ is not just inverted, but without temporary ‘churn over’ it would look more like an upright arrow with a very chunky head and slim body below it to support….. which portrays the issues ahead for working age in supporting the tax base and increasing numbers of aged dependents, how? 

Australia’s retirement income system generally comes up in the top 5-10 globally, due to superannuation and pension means testing.  However, many in Australia including both conservative MPs and those of the left, are being led into a cul de sac in both denying the benefits of industry super funds looking after members’ interests and for reduced or more restricted immigration hence access to Australia for temporary residents.

Worse, younger Australians’ futures are and will be thrown under the bus due to LNP and lesser extent the Labor Party, catering to ageing electorates with middle class welfare, low or no taxes and for now, a more nativist and insular view of the world due to Covid and our nativist conservative media oligopoly favouring the LNP and radical right libertarian policies.

From Inside Story Australia:

‘The end of the population pyramid: Fears about a declining birthrate reflect a twentieth-century view of how the economy works

1 June 2021 John Quiggin 

News of a sharp fall in births during 2020 has provoked a fresh wave of hand wringing about the implications of an ageing population. The decline can’t be attributed solely to the pandemic — most of the babies born in 2020 were conceived before the virus took hold — but it appears to have accelerated as the impact of the pandemic has been felt.

Some of the worries are prompted by old-fashioned, not to say primitive, concerns about birthrates as an indicator of “national vitality.” But they mainly reflect a twentieth-century view of the economy that is deeply embedded in our ways of thinking and economic measurement, even though it is now almost completely obsolete.

Underlying this view is the notion that “a surplus of young people” is needed to “drive economies and help pay for the old,” as the New York Times put it in its report on the 2020 figures. But this model of the economy only emerged in the twentieth century, and it looks likely to end in the twenty-first.

For most of human history, old people were expected to work as long as they could, just as children were put to work as soon as they were able. The very young and the very old depended on their families to support them.

That changed radically with the emergence of the welfare state at the end of the nineteenth century. Children were excluded from the workforce and required to attend school until the official leaving age, typically around fourteen. Governments paid for schools but generally required parents to support their children in other ways, as they’d done in the past.

At the other end of life, the new system of age pensions meant that old people (most commonly those over sixty-five) became entitled to public support, sometimes subject to a means test. Pensions were paid out of taxes or contributions to social security schemes.

Either way, the cost was borne by the “working-age” population, generally defined as fifteen to sixty-four. With a high birthrate, the age distribution of the population was shaped like a pyramid, with a large working-age population at the bottom supporting a small group of retirees at the top.

Underlying the pyramid was the idea that physical work predominated. Young, strong and needing only on-the-job training, workers would leave school at fourteen and immediately start contributing to the economy. By sixty-five, they would be worn out and ready for retirement. The more young people the better.

To see what’s happened to that assumption, we need only look at the US data on employment by age. At the turn of the twenty-first century, the pyramid concept looked reasonable enough. Around 60 per cent of young people aged sixteen to twenty-four were employed, compared with barely 30 per cent of those aged fifty-five and over.

By 2019, though, before the pandemic, the gap had largely closed. Just over 50 per cent of people aged sixteen to twenty-four were employed, compared with 39 per cent of those over fifty-five. While many of the jobs held by young people are now part-time and low-waged, older workers are typically earning just below the peak they reached at around age fifty. The figures suggest that average earnings per person are already higher among the old than among the young.

The modern economy is quite different from the one assumed by the conventional population pyramid. To become a productive member of the community, young people need academic or vocational post-school education, and that requires large-scale spending by government or parents, or through loan schemes like HECS. Even as the proportion of young people in the population has declined, developed countries like Australia and the United States have been able to maintain or even increase the proportion of national income allocated to education.

A return to high birthrates over the next few years would create the need for a large increase in education spending. The pay-off in terms of a more productive workforce would not be fully realised until the second half of this century, when the expanded age cohort entered the prime-age workforce in their late twenties and early thirties.

At the other end of the age distribution, official retirement ages have been abolished, and the eligibility age for the pension has been pushed to sixty-seven, with further increases in prospect. For a significant group of manual workers, physical exhaustion still makes retirement a relief. The undervaluing of older workers persists, pushing many into retirement whether they want it or not. But working past sixty-five is an increasingly attractive economic option for a large group of white-collar workers.

A realistic model of the future workforce is one in which productive workers are mostly aged between twenty-five and seventy. Given that life expectancy will never be much above ninety-five, the typical person will spend about half their life in the working-age population and the other half evenly divided between education and retirement.

In other words, despite the concerns expressed since the 2020 population figures were released, the age distribution associated with a lower birthrate is unlikely to cause major problems in how people in countries like Australia are supported during the years they spend out of the workforce.

Meanwhile, a lower birthrate is having an unambiguously beneficial impact on the size of the world’s population. The world is already overcrowded, and the growing population is straining the capacity of the planet. Even with falling birthrates, the world’s population is certain to rise between now and 2050.

By 2100, the total figure might return to the current level of eight billion, or perhaps a little fewer. The idea that we should push people to have more children in order to lift this number, rather than make marginal adjustments to the economic institutions we have inherited from the twentieth century, is simply nonsensical.’

For more articles about Ageing Democracy, Demography, Economics, Government Budgets, Immigration, Pensions, Statistical Analysis, Superannuation, Taxation and Younger Generations click through.