Japan – Australia: Ageing Populations – Demographic Socio Political Comparison

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From ANU Australian National University’s East Asia Forum, articles on the issue of demography, ageing, electoral and social security in Japan ‘The problematic politics of Japan’s ageing electorate’ and Australia ‘Maintaining Australia’s status as an immigration nation’. 

Both nations, like elsewhere, are ageing, but dealing with campaigns opposed to immigration to ameliorate working, tax revenue and budget stress, while many retired and elderly voters have short term horizons or simply vote for their own future security.

However, as this issue continues to become significant, especially Japan, there is little political will to deal with it openly and honestly, hence, working age and younger generations will need to deal with it, while having low expectations of state social security support.  

Meanwhile in Australia, there has been two decades of nativist ‘dog whistling’ (undefined) immigration and population growth, via legacy and independent media to persuade voters, yet media and policy makers seem not to understand the demographics, immigration, population and economic effects?

While there is below replacement fertility, fewer youth, working age has passed the ‘demographic sweet spot’, more retirees and increasing old age dependency ratios, that should settle by mid century; in the meantime temporary net migration inc. international students, maintain the working age cohort, pay taxes and for services, while supporting budget health.

The problematic politics of Japan’s ageing electorate

27 February 2023

Author: Yasuo Takao, Curtin University

Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida used a policy speech at the opening of the 2023 session of Japan’s parliament, the National Diet, to declare that Japan was ‘on the brink of not being able to maintain social functions’ due to the country’s population crisis. The country’s median age is 49 — the second highest in the world.

In the 2021 House of Representatives election, the median age of those who cast a vote was 59. The centre of gravity of Japanese electoral politics has shifted from taxpayers to pensioners, with the potential of the elderly exerting more political pressure over policymakers as the population ages.

The majoritarian decision-making model suggests that self-interested aging voters are likely to support increasingly generous social benefits for themselves, even at the expense of other generations.

In Japan, voter turnout has consistently been higher and is steadily increasing among older people. The age gap in Japan’s voter turnout is exceptionally high, with an OECD study finding a gap of 25 percentage points in voter turnout between voters 55 and older and voters under 35, compared with the OECD average of 12 points. Assuming that high turnout is a reflection of political interest, this implies that elderly voters influence politics in a self-interested way, to the detriment of younger generations.

But no studies have yet found clear evidence of such self-interest among Japan’s elderly voters. In the early 2000s, the Japanese public became seriously concerned about the country’s apparently unsustainable level of social security expenditure. The elderly, more than any other cohort of the population, consider social security issues to be important factors in casting their votes.

Japan’s older people may not be as explicitly self-interested as the median voter model would predict. A series of surveys conducted by Japan’s Cabinet Office and Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare found that elderly respondents supported policy constraints on social security just as much as other age cohorts.

Internationally, the Japanese elderly are seen as more accepting of intergenerational equity than the elderly in other countries. Cross-national surveys on those 60 and older, conducted by the Cabinet Office in 2005, 2010, 2015 and 2020, asked whether government policy should prioritise younger people over older people or vice versa. Japan had the highest percentage — 31 per cent — of respondents agreeing that ‘young people should be prioritised’ —compared to 14 per cent in the United States and 17 per cent in both Germany and Sweden.

On this evidence, self-interested voters seeking to maximise their own benefits seems less applicable in the case of the Japanese welfare state. But other factors might also be at play..

The primary factor influencing public attitudes toward social security is demographic changes. In the early 2000s, the urgent need for social security reform in response to Japan’s population crisis captured public attention. The debate that followed played a significant role in influencing the attitudes of the elderly toward social security benefits.

There is undoubtedly a distinctive generational difference in political attitudes. The dankai baby boomer cohort born between 1947 and 1949 experienced turbulent events in their youth — Japan’s rapid economic growth, anti-establishment student movements, industrial pollution and the Vietnam War among them. These dankai-specific experiences bred life-long progressive political attitudes and a propensity to embrace the common good rather than sectional interests. In the 2009 general election a plurality of 49 per cent of voters aged 60–69 voted for the Democratic Party of Japan, which toppled the conservative Liberal Democratic Party.

Japan’s elderly cohort also has the highest labour-force participation among the OECD countries. Nearly half of Japanese men aged 60–70 and one quarter of those aged 70–75 are still in the workforce. About three-quarters of the Japanese elderly workforce work in non-regular positions and consider social security issues important to their votes.

Despite having less secure employment, elderly voters do not necessarily influence politics in a self-interested way to the detriment of younger generations. Employed elderly people continue to find security in belonging to a particular company, which dissuades them from organising around their own interests with others beyond their company ties. Employed elderly people are more likely to identify with the interests of their younger co-workers.

Japan’s public, mandatory long-term care insurance has had a significant impact on the elderly. The dramatic rise of the costs of its operation has undermined its fiscal stability and this universal system weakens the interest in political activism by the elderly. Eligibility is not based on income or family situation but purely on age and physical and mental health.

Anyone 65 or older, plus those aged 40–64 with aging-related diseases, are eligible for institutional or community-based care.

Self-employed individuals, of whom 40 per cent are 65 or older and have no mandatory retirement age, hold opinions aligned with the protection of their small businesses, often against the interests of elderly consumption.

The aging of the Japanese electorate may not have led to politically charged generosity for the elderly at the expense of younger generations, but there are still many puzzles to unravel about how the elderly in Japan are affecting policy choices and political outcomes.

Yasuo Takao is Adjunct Senior Research Fellow at the School of Media, Culture and Creative Arts, Curtin University, Perth.

Maintaining Australia’s status as an immigration nation

20 May 2023

Authors: Stephen Clibborn and Chris F Wright, University of Sydney

Australia has been widely regarded internationally as an exemplary ‘nation of immigrants’, with migration policies that effectively serve the national interest. But since the mid-1990s, Australia’s migration system has shifted away from the long-term provision of skills for nation-building towards a guest worker model aimed at satisfying the short-term demands of business.

The current migration system inefficiently supplies skills, exposes temporary migrants to underpayment and mistreatment and poorly serves the national interest. It has disintegrated to a point where the recent Parkinson Review of the Migration System and Home Affairs Minister Clare O’Neil declared it ‘broken’ and in need of an overhaul.

The Parkinson Review identified three general principles to return to a sound migration system: tripartite involvement of unions and employer associations with government in designing and implementing policy, universality of regulation for migrants and mobility for migrants to transfer between employers. The government announced it will now undertake a major reform of the migration system using input from the Parkinson Review.

The government’s single concrete immediate policy announcement in response to the review was increasing the Temporary Skilled Migration Income Threshold (TSMIT), which was justified on grounds that it would help reduce exploitation of workers. This policy increases the effective minimum pay rate for some classes of migrant workers from AU$53,900, where it has languished since 2013, to AU$70,000. That means employers sponsoring temporary migrant workers under the Temporary Skill Shortage scheme from 1 July 2023 must pay a minimum annual salary of AU$70,000. This is a compromise between recommendations from business groups — AU$63,000 — and the Australian Council of Trade Unions — AU$90,000.

The government has stated that simplifying the migration system, delivering skills needed by business and reducing exploitation of migrant workers are its main priorities. Many of the Parkinson Review’s recommendations will help achieve these goals. Recommendations such as removing restrictions on temporary skilled migrants’ mobility between employers and independent assessment of skills demand are helpful. But other recommendations potentially undermine them, such as continued reliance on the TSMIT and creating three tiers of temporary labour migration. This may further complicate the system, reduce labour supply and maintain exploitation.

Historical and comparative research suggests that the government’s goals can be best achieved by strengthening ties between migration and employment regulations. Many problems with the migration system can be traced back to the expansion of temporary visas in 1996. Prior to this, the migration system was relatively simple. It supplied skills to business efficiently and migrant worker exploitation was lower. Complementary migration and employment regulations contributed to these outcomes.

Three changes would better align migration and employment regulations.

First, abandon the TSMIT pay threshold. Minister O’Neil’s headline policy announcement — raising the TSMIT — places excessive faith in salary level as a measure of skill and worker power. The Parkinson Review’s recommendation to build a three-tier system of employment regulation around salary levels does likewise on the basis that those workers paid above the TSMIT are likely to be at limited risk of exploitation. The policy focus should not be on the level of the threshold but its very existence.

For many years, Australia’s Minister for Home Affairs has had the power to set the TSMIT, resulting in pay rates being determined by political considerations rather than labour market assessments. This contrasts with the methodical and transparent way the Fair Work Commission’s Expert Panels set minimum wages.

Maintaining the TSMIT risks reinforcing separate labour markets for migrants and citizens, undermining the government’s objectives. An increased TSMIT could also price out some skilled jobs in sectors with pronounced labour demand, such as health, social care and hospitality. This would likely generate political pressure for new job-specific visas to address Australia’s skill needs, further complicating the migration system.

Second, independently assess skills needs. The Parkinson Review recommended using Jobs and Skills Australia, a new Commonwealth agency, to better align migration and labour market regulations. This agency will help to ensure migration better complements the education and training system. For decades these policy areas have been at cross-purposes, despite their mutual objectives of supplying necessary skills.

Using Jobs and Skills Australia to strengthen coordination between migration, on one hand, and education and training, on the other, will help ensure skills and workforce needs are assessed and addressed more reliably. This approach will give employers more confidence to invest in developing their workforces.

Third, enforce employment regulations more effectively. Without this, unscrupulous employers will continue to underpay and mistreat vulnerable temporary migrants, gaining a competitive advantage over honest operators. Without effective enforcement, businesses are discouraged from seeking to succeed through quality, innovation and productivity improvements, which are essential for Australia’s international competitiveness. The assumption that a certain level of pay in the TSMIT and a proposed higher-paid visa tier equates to individual worker power to resist underpayment is misplaced.

In implementing the Parkinson Review’s recommendations, the government must ensure migration regulations are better integrated with wider employment regulations. This will help achieve the government’s triple goals of simplifying the system, supplying skills more effectively and reducing worker exploitation. This will ensure the migration system continues to support Australia’s international standing as a successful ‘nation of immigrants’.

Stephen Clibborn is an Associate Professor and Co-Director of the Sydney Employment Relations Research Group at the University of Sydney Business School, University of Sydney.

Chris F Wright is an Associate Professor and Co-Director of the Sydney Employment Relations Research Group at the University of Sydney Business School, University of Sydney.

For related links and article on Ageing Democracy, Australian Immigration News, Demography, Government Budgets, Pensions, Taxation and Younger Generations click through:

Population Pyramids, Economics, Ageing, Pensions, Demography and Misunderstanding Data Sets

Australian Migration Review 2023 – For Immigrants and Nation or a Nativist Trap?

Global Population Decline and Impacts

Population Decline in Asia is Near with Africa to Follow

Population Decline and Effects on Taxation, Benefits, Economy and Society

Grey Tsunami – Electoral Demographics – Ageing Populations vs. Youth

Ageing Democracy, Nativism and Populism