Immigration to Australia – More Opportunities for Temporary Residents?

Interesting analysis from Grattan Institute in Melbourne on how to improve Australia’s migration system, especially for temporary entrants. 

However, although one agrees with the broad argument and sentiments, many assumptions and factors cited including the need to make more temporary residents permanent, would require raising, for now, the modest permanent cap, guaranteed to kick off a negative media campaign.

Further, one thinks it overestimates the desire for ‘temporary migrants’, caught under the ‘nebulous’ (Ian Dunt UK) NOM net overseas migration, to remain in Australia permanently after studies, travel, work etc.? 

On high numbers of temporary residents in Australia it misses important dynamics including Covid, precluding departures and department budget or headcount cuts which significantly slowed immigration processing? 

We have observed a generation of dog whistling all things immigration and population growth to the point where many Australians, including employers, view ‘immigrants’ and supposed ‘population growth’ as negatives to be avoided, or with antipathy? 

House prices and/or rentals may not be related to ‘immigration, especially as no analysis exists apart from FIRE sector’s agitprop in media using PR factors as indicators of market health eg. ‘prices’ not ‘real value’, advertised ‘prices’, auction clearance rates, claims of ‘high immigration’ etc.; but now prices are dropping?  

Capping temporary visas would be chaotic i.e. who decides, ignores multiple types and complexity of visa system, and Australian citizens also; nativists have argued for decades a strictly nativist ‘one person in, one person out’ border regime? 

Warnings of employment perils for temporary migrants, but local employees share similar issues, i.e. non compliance of awards and conditions by employers, with support from unions?  

Nominating a median level salary threshold for any skilled entrant ignores the need for unskilled employment gaps to be filled too?

At least this starts asking some questions and challenges long held assumptions on the benefits, or not, of immigration to Australia.  By coincidence Euractiv published an article titled ‘Sisyphus’ skills shortage’ that challenges the fixed or ‘steady state’ view of employment, insights include:

‘In politics, it’s normal to think about jobs as if there were a fixed amount of potential jobs that society should aim to fill. In this mindset, labour force shortages are half-empty glasses that we need to fill.

The danger of looking at labour markets in such a way is that there is always a danger of overflowing, in which new water pushes out the water already in the glass. This is the picture politicians have in mind when they warn that migrants might steal the jobs of locals.

However, the picture is not only dangerous – it is also wrong. An economy is not static, as a glass of water, an economy is dynamic…

…Companies and governments should do all they can to invest in getting the skills they need, be it through educational programmes, making it easier for women to take part in the labour force, or through labour-friendly immigration systems, even if it is a Sisyphean task.

Labourforce shortages are a sign of a thriving economy, skills shortages point to an innovative economy. Only in a depression is there no skills shortage.

Or, as French philosopher Albert Camus put it: “One must imagine Sisyphus happy.”’

The Conversation article excerpts from ‘How to improve the migration system for the good of temporary migrants – and Australia’ (Published: February 27, 2023)

‘The biggest review of Australia’s migration system in decades is due to be delivered to the federal government.

Commissioned by the Albanese government last September, its task is to identify reforms that will increase economic productivity, address challenges such as an ageing population, and make Australia a more desirable destination for highly skilled migrants.’

But perhaps its thorniest job is how to provide temporary migrants with clear pathways to permanent residency and citizenship. This won’t be easy, given how much the number of temporary migrants in Australia now outstrips the permanent visas on offer.

It’s impossible to run an uncapped temporary migration program with a capped permanent program and offer all long-term temporary visa holders a road to permanent residency.

Something has to give.’

No, as temporary entrants or residents, described as migrants is incorrect, as most are international students, and understand that long term permanence requires an application for migration, which comes under the permanent cap; many are content being temporary residents but baulk at permanent.

‘Simple arithmetic: demand exceeds supply’

No, as temporary entrants or residents under the NOM net overseas migration, being described as migrants is incorrect, as most are international students who understand that long term permanence requires an application for migration, which comes under the permanent cap (they understand this system better than Australians).

‘This is far in excess of the cap on permanent visas offered. In 2019, the Morrison government reduced the cap from 190,000 to 160,000 places a year. The Albanese government raised it to 195,000 for the 2022-23 financial year. It remains to be seen what will happen in future years.

The queue is getting longer

Not all temporary visa-holders want to stay in Australia, but many do. Most migrants are already in Australia on a temporary visa when they receive their permanent visa.

But with a greater number of temporary residents vying for permanent residency, the wait times are rising, and migrants’ prospects of success are declining.’

Contestable as temporary migration is a solution used as ‘churnover’ of ‘net financial budget contributors’ (not staying long term nor accessing social security later), slow or no processing may be ideologically driven e.g. cutting department head counts or costs and creating uncertainty for applicants i.e. ‘hostile environment’ with suboptimal employment conditions, while Covid helped in backing up both applications and temporary residents onshore.

‘Many employers are reluctant to hire international graduates on temporary visas, instead hiring applicants who already have permanent residency. This helps explain why a quarter of recent graduates (on temporary graduate visas) are either unemployed or not looking for work. Most that do work earn no more than working holiday-makers, despite being more qualified.’

Much of this confusion can be blamed on local and imported nativist agitprop inspired by the original US fossil fueled Malthusian ZPG Zero Population Growth movement viewing (locally), post 1970s ‘immigrants’ as an environmental ‘hygiene’ issue and foil to demands for carbon pricing and transition to renewable sources; most media in Australia unwittingly reflect or even encourage similar attitudes of antipathy towards immigrants.

‘What to do about it?

Offering a permanent visa to every long-term temporary migrant who wants one would require an enormous, and unpopular, increase in Australia’s permanent intake.

Even a smaller, more realistic, increase in the permanent intake would come with costs – notably more expensive housing.’

On housing, there is little compelling evidence or analysis when house prices are falling, even more so in real terms, while most real estate data are PR factors?

‘Capping temporary visas would reduce pressure on already-rising rents. But it would also make it harder for some employers and mean fewer international students paying fees to universities.’

Create chaos through more bureaucracy being applied to foreign entrants i.e. takes decision making of education institutions out of their hands, plus individual students, backpackers etc. and requires an entry approval system a la nativists’ ‘one in one out’; increasing hurdles for everyone including Australians if too many want to return in a short time?

‘So what should we do?

We should continue to give priority to younger, skilled migrants for permanent visas. Pathways to permanent residency should not be automatic nor based on how long temporary migrants have been in Australia. A guaranteed pathway to permanent residency in Australia will only encourage more people to come here on temporary visas, and those already here to stay even longer.

We should also avoid creating new temporary visa programs for less skilled workers in areas such as agriculture or the care economy, because they only add to demand for more permanent visas down the track.

We must acknowledge that not all temporary migrants can stay in Australia, even if they want to.’

Fair, but why is it about doing something about migrants versus ensuring coverage and compliance of employee wages and conditions by employers, with unions, regulators, peak employer groups and local councils for both locals and migrants?

‘Change the selection criteria

The current policy grants permanent skilled work visas on the basis of occupation. This should change to whether migrants can earn a good wage – demonstrated by a sponsoring employer being willing to pay them at least A$85,000 a year.

Another reform would be to allow temporary skilled migrants to work in any occupation, provided they earn more than A$70,000 a year, so they can build their skills and careers in Australia before securing permanent residency.’

Why the arbitrary near median salary threshold when there is a need not only for highly skilled temporary immigrants, but also low skilled below median salary, as our demographic decline does not discriminate between skilled and unskilled occupations and employees, nor does mortality?

‘Creating a better system for points-tested visas – which is how many students secure permanent residency – would also help. The current system encourages migrants to gain points through spending thousands of dollars on low-value courses, or by moving to regional areas where there are fewer job opportunities.

Instead, there should be a single points-tested visa, where points are only allocated for characteristics that point to a migrants’ future success in Australia.

The aim of the migration system should be to create clearer pathways to permanent residency in Australia. But that doesn’t mean that everyone who wants to stay can do so.’

For more related articles on Ageing democracy, Australian immigration news, Demography, Economics, International Student, NOM Net Overseas Migration, Political Strategy and Younger Generations click through or read below:

Economic Research – No Negative Relationship with Immigration and Wages, Income or Employment

Immigration Immigrants and Public Misconceptions

Immigration is not Cause of Unemployment

Immigration Population Growth Decline NOM Net Overseas Migration

Population Pyramids, Economics, Ageing, Pensions, Demography and Misunderstanding Data Sets

International Education – Experience of Students and Stakeholders

International Education – Foreign Student – Value

Population Pyramids, Economics, Ageing, Pensions, Demography and Misunderstanding Data Sets

Interesting article ‘The end of the population pyramid’  but one would suggest that it’s no longer a ‘population pyramid’ inverted or otherwise, while ‘pro-natal’ or positive eugenics policies and working age population data require more scrutiny, especially when backgrounded by antipathy in Australian (UK and US ) media and politics towards post 1970s ‘immigration’, influencing older monocultural voters (ditto Hungary etc. to avoid ‘immigration’ central to conservative political messaging, even to the point of conspiracy theories like round ‘Soros’).  

For example, constantly conflating increased temporary churn over via the NOM (since 2006) from students etc. with permanent migration yet there is no strong if any correlation, then worse, blaming the same ‘population growth’ for environmental degradation (allowing fossil fuels and regulation off the hook AKA strategy of  ZPG supported by Rockefeller Bros, Ford and Carnegie Foundations in the ’70s, and with the mantle passing to Kochs and similar groups).

The world, especially including more educated and empowered women in the developing world, have already decided to have fewer children reflected in sliding fertility rates to below replacement; not aware of any research showing substantive outcomes from pro-natal policies except bringing plans forward on having children, to be followed by a fertility dip?

Population data cannot be compared easily in a global context due to different definitions, collection methods and presentation, while demographers use multiple types of population data sets to base their e.g. workforce analysis on, related to dependency ratios and pensions.  

For example, in some cases economists are using some dubious methods in arguing the case against offering an increase in the SCG super contribution guarantee by claiming a binary i.e. would preclude any wage rises; also claiming increased sustainability of the state pension by claiming a low(er) dependency ratio by falsely presenting plenty of workers to support a future of pensions only (no need for super).

However, ‘statistics 101’, it appears that the forecasts or projections of the general or ‘estimated resident population’ counting 15-64 year olds of ‘working age’, but not parsing through or filtering out the significant numbers of ‘temporary residents’ caught up in the NOM who have limited and/or no work rights vs. citizens and permanent residents with no restrictions.

If the latter is presented well, then the ‘population pyramid’ is not just inverted, but without temporary ‘churn over’ it would look more like an upright arrow with a very chunky head and slim body below it to support….. which portrays the issues ahead for working age in supporting the tax base and increasing numbers of aged dependents, how? 

Australia’s retirement income system generally comes up in the top 5-10 globally, due to superannuation and pension means testing.  However, many in Australia including both conservative MPs and those of the left, are being led into a cul de sac in both denying the benefits of industry super funds looking after members’ interests and for reduced or more restricted immigration hence access to Australia for temporary residents.

Worse, younger Australians’ futures are and will be thrown under the bus due to LNP and lesser extent the Labor Party, catering to ageing electorates with middle class welfare, low or no taxes and for now, a more nativist and insular view of the world due to Covid and our nativist conservative media oligopoly favouring the LNP and radical right libertarian policies.

From Inside Story Australia:

‘The end of the population pyramid: Fears about a declining birthrate reflect a twentieth-century view of how the economy works

1 June 2021 John Quiggin 

News of a sharp fall in births during 2020 has provoked a fresh wave of hand wringing about the implications of an ageing population. The decline can’t be attributed solely to the pandemic — most of the babies born in 2020 were conceived before the virus took hold — but it appears to have accelerated as the impact of the pandemic has been felt.

Some of the worries are prompted by old-fashioned, not to say primitive, concerns about birthrates as an indicator of “national vitality.” But they mainly reflect a twentieth-century view of the economy that is deeply embedded in our ways of thinking and economic measurement, even though it is now almost completely obsolete.

Underlying this view is the notion that “a surplus of young people” is needed to “drive economies and help pay for the old,” as the New York Times put it in its report on the 2020 figures. But this model of the economy only emerged in the twentieth century, and it looks likely to end in the twenty-first.

For most of human history, old people were expected to work as long as they could, just as children were put to work as soon as they were able. The very young and the very old depended on their families to support them.

That changed radically with the emergence of the welfare state at the end of the nineteenth century. Children were excluded from the workforce and required to attend school until the official leaving age, typically around fourteen. Governments paid for schools but generally required parents to support their children in other ways, as they’d done in the past.

At the other end of life, the new system of age pensions meant that old people (most commonly those over sixty-five) became entitled to public support, sometimes subject to a means test. Pensions were paid out of taxes or contributions to social security schemes.

Either way, the cost was borne by the “working-age” population, generally defined as fifteen to sixty-four. With a high birthrate, the age distribution of the population was shaped like a pyramid, with a large working-age population at the bottom supporting a small group of retirees at the top.

Underlying the pyramid was the idea that physical work predominated. Young, strong and needing only on-the-job training, workers would leave school at fourteen and immediately start contributing to the economy. By sixty-five, they would be worn out and ready for retirement. The more young people the better.

To see what’s happened to that assumption, we need only look at the US data on employment by age. At the turn of the twenty-first century, the pyramid concept looked reasonable enough. Around 60 per cent of young people aged sixteen to twenty-four were employed, compared with barely 30 per cent of those aged fifty-five and over.

By 2019, though, before the pandemic, the gap had largely closed. Just over 50 per cent of people aged sixteen to twenty-four were employed, compared with 39 per cent of those over fifty-five. While many of the jobs held by young people are now part-time and low-waged, older workers are typically earning just below the peak they reached at around age fifty. The figures suggest that average earnings per person are already higher among the old than among the young.

The modern economy is quite different from the one assumed by the conventional population pyramid. To become a productive member of the community, young people need academic or vocational post-school education, and that requires large-scale spending by government or parents, or through loan schemes like HECS. Even as the proportion of young people in the population has declined, developed countries like Australia and the United States have been able to maintain or even increase the proportion of national income allocated to education.

A return to high birthrates over the next few years would create the need for a large increase in education spending. The pay-off in terms of a more productive workforce would not be fully realised until the second half of this century, when the expanded age cohort entered the prime-age workforce in their late twenties and early thirties.

At the other end of the age distribution, official retirement ages have been abolished, and the eligibility age for the pension has been pushed to sixty-seven, with further increases in prospect. For a significant group of manual workers, physical exhaustion still makes retirement a relief. The undervaluing of older workers persists, pushing many into retirement whether they want it or not. But working past sixty-five is an increasingly attractive economic option for a large group of white-collar workers.

A realistic model of the future workforce is one in which productive workers are mostly aged between twenty-five and seventy. Given that life expectancy will never be much above ninety-five, the typical person will spend about half their life in the working-age population and the other half evenly divided between education and retirement.

In other words, despite the concerns expressed since the 2020 population figures were released, the age distribution associated with a lower birthrate is unlikely to cause major problems in how people in countries like Australia are supported during the years they spend out of the workforce.

Meanwhile, a lower birthrate is having an unambiguously beneficial impact on the size of the world’s population. The world is already overcrowded, and the growing population is straining the capacity of the planet. Even with falling birthrates, the world’s population is certain to rise between now and 2050.

By 2100, the total figure might return to the current level of eight billion, or perhaps a little fewer. The idea that we should push people to have more children in order to lift this number, rather than make marginal adjustments to the economic institutions we have inherited from the twentieth century, is simply nonsensical.’

For more articles about Ageing Democracy, Demography, Economics, Government Budgets, Immigration, Pensions, Statistical Analysis, Superannuation, Taxation and Younger Generations click through.